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Abstract 
One of the most intriguing topic addressed by researchers across the cognitive sciences 
concerns the “self” and the self-other distinction. The present thesis adds to this debate 
by exploring the recognition of bodily self, based on visual and acoustical information. 
The first part of the present dissertation focuses on mechanisms and neural bases of 
bodily self,  adopting a classical neuropsychological approach. Brain damaged patients 
were submitted to two different tasks designed for testing implicit and explicit self-
body recognition using pictures depicting left and right hands as stimuli that belong to 
the participant or to other people.  
In Study 1, right and left brain damaged patients‟ performance was compared to verify 
whether implicit and explicit self-body recognition are mediated by different cerebral 
networks that can be selectively impaired after focal brain lesion. A Voxel-based 
lesion-symptom mapping analysis revealed that an integrated cortical–subcortical right 
frontal (motor) network is crucial for an implicit knowledge of one‟s own body. 
Conversely, both hemispheres contribute to an explicit knowledge of our body. In 
addition, Study 2 demonstrates how the implicit and explicit bodily knowledge is 
selectively impaired in patients with and without pathological embodiment of others‟ 
body. 
The second part of the thesis explores the contribution of voice to self/other 
distinction. In Study 3, implicit and explicit self-voice recognition was investigated in 
healthy individuals.  Interestingly, self-voice was better processed when an implicit 
rather than an explicit recognition was required. Finally, in Study 4, the anatomical 
basis of implicit and explicit self-voice recognition was investigated in 
neuropsychological patients. Behavioural and anatomical data demonstrates the 
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involvement of right hemisphere in implicit processing and the joint contribution of 
both hemispheres in explicit recognition of self-voice. 
Overall, this thesis highlights the role played by visual and acoustic cues in building 
the sense of body-ownership.  
10 
 
General introduction  
One of the most intriguing issue discussed in neuroscience, psychology and 
philosophy is “What is the self?” (Gallagher, 2000; Gallagher & Frith, 2003; 
Metzinger & Gallese, 2003; Northoff, 2006). Traditionally, the self is considered 
a high-order function reflected in memory and other high-level judgements. 
However, other lines of research suggested a close and intimate relationship 
between the self and more low-level functions, such as self-consciousness, 
emotion and perception (Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2010; Northoff, 2016).  
For instance, as Feinberg (2005) suggested, Self is a multilayered concept that 
involved at least three different aspects: a narrative, a relational and a bodily self. 
The narrative self is how one describes one‟s past and present circumstances and 
relates one‟s personal history; the relational self emerges in the interaction with 
others and it represents how the individual thinks about himself related to objects 
and to other persons in the world; last, the bodily self represents the most 
physical component.  
Here, I will consider this last aspect, that is the bodily self, and the role that it 
plays in self-recognition and self-other discrimination. Thus, in the present 
thesis, with bodily self processing, I will refer to the multifaceted process 
through which we recognize, visual or acoustic stimuli as part of our corporeal 
appearance. 
In every present moment of our lives, we experience the feeling of having a body 
through our senses. We constantly receive proprioceptive, visual and 
somatosensory information, as well as visceral and motor signals through which 
we built a coherent sense of our body. Whether and to what extent, holding a 
11 
 
coherent bodily self-representation is relevant in constructing and maintaining 
the basic awareness of ourselves as unitary, are examined here.  
Even if, several attempts have been made in order to understand the different 
processes that are involved in the building up of normal body awareness, they 
are far from being clear. In the current work we sought to provide new insights 
on mechanisms underlying our sense of self by using a classical 
neuropsychological approach. Indeed, we focus on impaired mechanism in order 
to clarify the pathological and normal functioning.  
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Chapter 1 
 
The bodily self-recognition 
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1.1 Bodies and body-parts perception 
The appearance of the human body is an important component of our identity 
and one of the most distinctive physical feature. Accordingly, the human brain 
devotes considerably cortical resources to representing visual information about 
the human body (Berlucchi & Aglioti, 2010; Peelen & Downing, 2007; 
Schwoebel & Coslett, 2005). Accumulating evidence on the neural 
underpinnings of body perception in the human temporal lobes have converged 
around two body selective regions of the human brain, identified with functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and transcranial magnetic stimulation 
(TMS). These are the extrastriate body area (EBA) found in the posterior inferior 
temporal sulcus/middle temporal gyrus, and the fusiform body area (FBA) found 
ventrally on the fusiform gyrus (see Figure 1.1; Downing et al., 2001; Kaiser et 
al., 2014; Peelen & Downing 2005; Schwarzlose et al., 2005; Uddin et al., 2006; 
Urgesi et al., 2007). These areas constitute an occipitotemporal network 
specialized for bodily perception that jointly create a general visual 
representation of human body (Downing & Peelen, 2011).  
However, this representation does not include high-level information about 
identity, action or emotional state, that probably results from the interaction 
among FBA and EBA with other interconnected areas, such as visual and motor 
regions. For example, the proximity of EBA to motion-selective regions, such as 
the visual area hMT+, suggests that it interacts with dynamic visual 
representations related to motor functions (Pitcher et al., 2009). Viewing another 
person to move their body while performing an action allows us to extract 
crucial social information related to the agent‟s identity and the meaning of the 
actions. 
14 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 - Location of occipitotemporal body-selective regions 
From Downing and Peelen, (2011). 
 
An interesting contribution to understand the functional significance of EBA and 
FBA relies on testing the consequences of brain lesion in patients or in 
neurologically healthy individuals by using repetitive transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (rTMS). For instance, in order to investigate the causative role of 
EBA and ventral premotor cortex (vPMc) in the visual discrimination of bodily 
forms and bodily actions, Urgesi and colleagues (2007) create a “temporary 
lesion” applying the rTMS over EBA and vPMc in both hemispheres. Stimuli 
consisted of pictures depicting upper and lower body-parts paired as to depicted 
the same model performing two different actions (action discrimination task) or 
the same action performed by two different models (form discrimination task). 
Participants were required to decide which of two images matched a single 
sample previously seen. As a result, the temporary inactivation of EBA impaired 
the visual discrimination of body forms but not of body actions, in contrast when 
the rTMS was applied to vPMc impaired the discrimination of body actions but 
not of body forms (see Figure 1.2).  
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Figure 1.2 - The experimental procedure adopted by Urgesi and colleagues  
Stimuli (A), experimental procedure (B), site of stimulation (C) and main results according with the 
stimulation site (D). From Urgesi et al., (2007). 
 
Furthermore, this results is also supported by a neuropsychological investigation 
conducted by Moro and colleagues (2008) in which, using the same paradigm 
above described (Urgesi et al., 2007), the neural correlates of body action and 
body form discrimination were explored. To this aim, twenty-eight patients 
suffering from stroke were recruited. Patients were divided in two groups 
according with the lesion site: half of them were affected by lesion involving the 
prerolandic region (anterior group) and the other half were affected by temporo-
parietal-occipital lesions (posterior group). Authors demonstrated a clear double 
dissociation since patients with anterior lesions were more impaired in the body 
action than in the body form discrimination task, and conversely patients with 
posterior lesions were more impaired in the body form than in the body action 
16 
 
discrimination task. This behavioural evidence is further confirmed by the 
Voxel-Based Lesion-Symptom Mapping analysis (VLSM), a technique 
specifically developed for the purpose of identifying lesion–symptom 
relationships in stroke patients. The observed deficit in the action discrimination 
task were associated with lesions of ventral premotor cortex, whereas impaired 
performances in the body form discrimination task were associated with lesions 
of middle occipitotemporal cortex and inferior occipital cortex (see Figure 1.3). 
 
Figure 1.3 - Brain lesions associated with deficit in body form and body action 
discrimination. 
Lesions were shown in yellow and blue color respectively. Adapted from Moro et al., (2008). 
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1.2 The recognition of the bodily self 
We all constantly experience the boundaries between our body and the external 
world, a feeling that contribute to the common sense of having a body. However, 
within this experience several aspects can be identify. For instance, the feeling 
that allow us to perceive a body-part as part of our body and belonging to 
ourselves, that is defined “sense of body-ownership”. Moreover, our body may 
be consider as an interface between the environment and the phenomenal self 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1964). Indeed, we constantly act in the world, arising the 
feeling of being the one who generates an action using our own body. This 
feeling is defined “sense of agency”. Both these constructs, the body-ownership 
and the agency, jointly contributed to our ability of physically distinguish 
ourselves from others. Thus, in this chapter we will focus on bodily self-
recognition, that‟s how we recognize a body or a body-part as our own.  
A first attempt in order to investigate the neuroanatomical locations underlying 
self-face and self-body recognition was carried out adopting the fMRI technique 
by Deveu and colleagues (2007). Pictures depicting face and whole-body 
belonged to the participants or to a friend (defined as familiar other) were 
adopted as stimuli. For each type of stimulus, two alterations were applied: the 
interocular distance and the waist-to-hip ratio was decreased or increased of 
10%. Participants were presented with intact and altered pictures of faces and 
bodies. The cerebral activity was measured while they performed the 
experimental task: they had to indicate the real appearance of themselves and of 
a familiar other. Neuroimaging data revealed that faces perception was 
associated with a bilateral activity in the middle occipital gyrus, extending to the 
fusiform gyrus on the right and to the cerebellum on the left, as well as with 
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activation of a large frontal area on the right side (middle and inferior frontal 
gyrus, and medial/superior frontal gyrus). By contrast, body perception was 
associated with activity in the fusiform and lateral occipital complex bilaterally, 
and with activity in the left middle occipital gyrus. More specifically, contrasting 
the cerebral activity found for self vs. familiar body, a greater activation was 
found in the superior frontal sulcus and in the cingulate cortex on the right, and 
in the inferior frontal gyrus on the left, and anterior insula bilaterally. Moreover, 
when contrasting the cerebral activity found for self vs. familiar face, activation 
was found in the right inferior frontal gyrus and in the insula. To summarize, 
these findings suggested that distinct brain networks underlie the one‟s own 
compared to others body and face perception.  
Furthermore, recent evidence suggested that we are able to implicitly recognize 
the one‟s own body (Frassinetti et al., 2008, 2009). Indeed, when performing a 
visual matching task with picture of body-parts (e.g. hands, limbs, legs, feet) 
belonged to the participant or to other people, neurologically healthy individuals 
showed the so-called self-advantage effect. Namely, participants exhibit a better 
performance when self than others stimuli were presented.  
In a subsequent work, Frassinetti and colleagues (2011) investigated whether the 
body self-advantage emerged also when participants are explicitly required to 
recognize their own body. In this study, body effectors (hands and feet) and 
inanimate object (shoes and phone) were adopted as experimental stimuli. Each 
of them could belong to the participant (self stimuli) or to others people (other 
stimuli). The visual matching task was adopted as an Implicit task. Three stimuli 
depicting the same body effector, or the same type of inanimate-object, were 
simultaneously presented in each trial, aligned along the vertical meridian of the 
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computer screen. The central stimulus corresponded to the target stimulus and 
participants were required to press, as soon as they decided whether the upper or 
the lower stimulus matched the central one. In the Explicit task, the same stimuli 
were adopted and participants were requested to indicate whether the upper or 
the lower image, or none of these, corresponded to their own body-effector or 
object (see Figure 1.4).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As a result, in the Implicit task participants were more accurate with self- 
compared to other body-parts, whereas this effect was not present for object 
stimuli. Moreover, a lack of this facilitation was found in the Explicit task in 
which a self-disadvantage emerged. Indeed, participants performed substantially 
worse with their own than with other body-parts. Thus, the main result of this 
 
Figure 1.4 - An example of a single trial adopted by Frassinetti et al., (2011)  
Single trial for the Implicit and Explicit task were shown on left and right side, respectively.  
Adapted from Frassinetti et al., (2011). 
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study is that the self-advantage for body-effectors emerged only when an explicit 
recognition of them was not required. These results suggest that implicit 
recognition and explicit recognition of the body self are based on different 
mechanisms and probably they constitute distinct ways to access to body self-
representation. 
Looking more deeply at the mechanism underlying the self-advantage effect, the 
authors suggested that bodily self-recognition is based upon a sensorimotor, 
rather than a mere visual representation of one‟s own body. This hypothesis was 
further confirmed by a subsequent study in which a laterality judgment task was 
adopted. Ferri and colleagues (2011) submitted a group of healthy participants to 
two different tasks designed to test Implicit and Explicit bodily self-recognition. 
Pictures depicting left and right hands, rotated at different angle, were used as 
experimental stimuli. According with previous studies, picture belonged to the 
participant or to other people in order to constitute the self and other‟s stimuli. In 
the Implicit task participants had to judge the laterality of the stimuli, while in 
the Explicit task participants were required to explicitly judge whether the 
displayed hand corresponded or not to their own hand.  
Authors adopted the laterality judgment task because it is well known that in 
order to perform it, participants simulate a motor rotation of their own hand so as 
to match the observed stimulus (Ionta et al., 2007; Parson, 1994). Accordingly, 
the laterality judgement task should be easier when the displayed stimulus is the 
participant‟s hand. Indeed, only in this case, the displayed stimulus matches with 
the mentally rotated, and the self-advantage should emerge. Results showed a 
facilitation, that‟s means faster response time when judging one‟s own right 
compared to others‟ hands. By contrast, such an advantage was not found in the 
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Explicit task, where bodily self-recognition was explicitly investigated. Indeed, a 
worse performance with self-related stimuli compared to other-related stimuli 
was observed (see Figure 1.5).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, the presence of the self-advantage only for participants‟ right hand  is 
likely to be a further argument in favour of the motor hypothesis of the self-
advantage. Indeed, the presence of the “self-advantage” only for the right hand 
Figure 1.5 Mean response times at the different self’ and others’ hands stimuli orientations in the Implicit task 
(upper panel) and Explicit task (lower panel). Error bars depict the standard error of the mean. 
Adapted from Ferri et al., (2011). 
700 
Figure 1.5 – The mean of RT in the Implicit and Explicit task.  
The mean of RTs as a function of Ownership (Self, Other) and Laterality (left and right hand) in the Implicit (upper 
panel) and Explicit Task (lower panel). Error bars depict the standard error of the mean.  
Adapted from Ferri et al., (2011). 
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can be explained by the greater lateralization in hand motor skills observed in 
right-handers compared to left-handers (Gentilucci et al., 1998).  
This latter hypothesis is also supported by a recent fMRI study (Ferri et al., 
2012) in which a group of healthy participants were scanned while they 
performed the laterality judgment task previously described. fMRI data revealed 
a neural network for the representation of the bodily self involving motor areas, 
such as the supplemental motor area (SMA) and pre-SMA, the anterior insula 
and the occipital cortex. Critically, the representation of the one‟s own right hand 
was confined to the left premotor cortex supporting the existence of a sense of 
bodily self embedded within the sensorimotor system. 
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1.3 Disorders related to bodily self-representation: evidence from brain 
damaged patients.  
In this section we will focus on neuropsychological investigations which 
revealed how the bodily self-knowledge may be lost following a brain lesion. 
Indeed, neurological patients are frequently affected by a sensorimotor 
hemisyndrome to the contralesional side of the body. Thus, is very common that 
a pathological bodily self-representation involves the affected hemisoma.   
One of the most studied clinical conditions, is the somatoparaphrenia 
(Gertsmann, 1942; Invernizzi et al., 2013; Vallar & Ronchi, 2009). 
Somatoparaphrenia is defined as the acquired delusion and confabulation about 
the contralesional side of the body. It is a neuropsychological disorder in which 
patients typically deny the ownership of their contralesional limbs, which they 
attribute to others. This condition is typically found in the acute post-ictal phase 
and it is often associated with right brain lesions (Gandola et al., 2012).  
Furthermore, when patients deny the contralesional motor and/or sensory deficit 
affecting their hemisoma, we refer to the anosognosia for hemiplegia and 
hemianestesia, respectively. The anosognosia for hemiplegia is frequently 
associated with right brain lesion involving areas related to the programming of 
motor acts, particularly Brodmann‟s premotor areas 6 and 44, motor area 4, and 
the somatosensory cortex (Berti et al., 2005). Concerning anosognosia for 
hemianestesia, in order to identify the lesion responsible for, in a recent study a 
voxelwise statistical analysis was conducted. The critical lesion was found 
confined to the anterior part of the putamen (Pia et al., 2014). The authors 
suggested that anosognosia for hemianaesthesia is mainly due to a failure in 
detecting the mismatch between expected and actual tactile stimulation. 
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As far as the facilitation observed for self- compared to other body-parts 
(Frassinetti et al., 2008, 2011) described in the previous section, further 
neuropsychological investigations have explored its neural correlates recruiting 
left (LBD) and right brain damage (RBD) patients (Frassinetti et al., 2008). A 
group of healthy participants and brain damage patients were submitted to a 
visual matching to sample task designed to implicitly assess the self-body 
recognition. In a first experiment, body-parts belonged to the participant or to 
other people were adopted as stimuli. Aim of this experiment was to verify 
whether the right hemisphere was specialized for self body-parts processing. As 
predicted, RBD patients were more impaired than LBD patients in self body-
parts recognition, whereas no difference was found between RBD and LBD 
patients when judging other people‟s body-parts. Crucially, the self-advantage 
effect was present both in controls and LBD patients but not in RBD patients, 
who did not show any facilitation with self- compared to other body-parts.  
In a second experiment, authors aimed at verify whether the observed deficit in 
RBD damaged patients was selective for self body-parts processing or merely 
due to a general deficit in body-parts processing. Thus, body-, face and object 
parts were adopted as stimuli. The results demonstrated that RBD patients‟ 
deficit was comparable across stimulus categories (face, body, object), thus 
excluding the presence of any selective deficit in the visual processing of body-
parts. These findings supported the idea that RBD, but not LBD patients are 
selective impaired in “self body-parts” recognition. The patients‟ lesions analysis 
indicates that the “self body-parts” processing seems to be subtended by a 
specific network within the right hemisphere, which mainly involves frontal and 
parietal areas (see Figure 1.6).  
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Figure 1.6 - The brain lesion associated with self body-parts recognition 
impairment. 
Illustration shows the graphical subtraction of areas damaged in RBD patients without “self body-parts” 
recognition impairment and in RBD patients with “self body-parts” recognition impairment. 
Adapted from Frassinetti et al., (2008). 
 
In a subsequent study, Frassinetti and colleagues (2010) provide further support 
to the right lateralization of bodily self-processing. Indeed, they compared a 
group of RBD patients with a group of neurologically healthy individuals in a 
visual matching to sample task in which body- and face-parts were adopted as 
stimuli. Healthy participants showed the so-called self-advantage, since they 
were more accurate in processing pictures representing their own as compared to 
other people‟s body- and face-parts. Concerning RBD patients, the authors 
demonstrated that a subgroup of RBD patients (G1) was selectively impaired in 
self body-parts processing. By contrast, other RBD patients were not impaired 
neither in self body- or self face-parts processing, since they exhibit a self-
advantage effect for both stimuli categories. To sum up, the authors sought 
experimental evidence on the neural correlates underlying the processing of self 
body- and face-parts, demonstrating that these functions can be selectively 
impaired following a brain lesion.  
Overall, evidence here reported demonstrate that RBD but not LBD patients 
were impaired in implicit self-body processing. However, less is known 
concerning the explicit processing of the one‟s own body. The study presented in 
Chapter 3  is designed to address this unanswered question. 
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Very recently, an interesting phenomena concerning the bodily self-
representation has been described in neuropsychological patients affected by an 
atypical form of hemisomatognosia (Garbarini et al., 2013). Hemisomatognosia 
is a clinical condition commonly observed in right-brain damaged patients with a 
paralysis of the contralateral limbs. In this syndrome, patients typically deny the 
ownership of a part of their body, they show hemispatial neglect, and they are 
anosognosic for their condition (Zeller et al., 2011). By contrast, patients 
described by Garbarini and colleagues (2013), didn‟t show the classical and well 
known form of hemisomatognosia. Indeed, they didn‟t explicitly disowner their 
contralesional limbs but they claimed that the examiner‟s left hand was their own 
hand, whenever it was positioned in egocentric coordinates, on the table near 
their real hand. Moreover, when the examiner moved his/her left hand, patients 
claimed that they were moving their own (paralysed) hand. Authors‟ hypothesis 
is that this delusion of ownership was not the result of a mere verbal 
confabulation but the result of a physical “embodiment” that alters patient‟s 
motor behavior. To test this hypothesis, a group of neurologically healthy 
participants and a group of hemiplegic patients, with (E+) and without (E-) alien-
limb embodiment were submitted to a bimanual coupling task. Basically, 
participants were asked to simultaneously draw lines with one hand and circles 
with the other. When healthy participants performed the task, both trajectories 
assume oval shapes, indicating that the motor programs of one hand affects the 
motor programs of the other hand (coupling effect; see Figure 1.7). 
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Hemiplegic patients were asked to draw lines with their right (healthy) hand and 
to „try‟ to draw circles with the left (paralyzed) hand in different conditions:  
- when an alien left hand simultaneously drew circles  
- when only the patient‟s hands were presented  
 
Figure 1.7 - Circle-Lines bimanual motor task. 
The illustration shows the participant while simultaneously performing lines with the right and circles with 
the left hand. Adapted from Garbarini et al., (2012). 
The baseline condition is considered when only the right hand drew lines. 
Results showed that, when only the patients‟ hands were present, neither E+ nor 
E– patients showed a significant coupling effect. This confirmed that, although 
requested „to try‟ to move their left hand, hemiplegic patients, didn‟t produce 
any effective motor programming. Crucially in the alien hand condition, E+ 
patients, but not E- patients,  showed a significant coupling effect. The coupling 
effect found in the alien condition clearly shows that E+ patients‟ altered sense 
of body ownership affects both their motor awareness and their sense of agency.  
This result suggested that our body representation is dynamic. In addition, based 
on these evidence, it could be hypothesized that self-body awareness is not a 
unique knowledge, but it is characterized by multiple levels, and only their 
integration makes what we commonly refer to self-body awareness. Indeed, 
these patients didn‟t show any relevant symptoms that can be clearly referred to 
an impairment of body awareness before participating in the study. However, 
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during the alien hand condition, when asked to reach their hand, patients 
identified as own hand the alien hand, thus showing a kind of implicit sense of 
disownership. Regarding this last point, we may speculate that the construction 
of body awareness is a multifaceted process resulting from the integration of 
different aspects. In this respect, the ability to correctly recognize the one‟s own 
body-parts is likely to be crucial. As we have already described in this section, 
previous studies (Frassinetti et al, 2008, 2010) reported a deficit in implicit self-
body recognition in right brain damaged patients. At this point, an interesting 
question arises spontaneously: should patients, who showed an altered sense of 
body-ownership, as well as E+ patients, be impaired also in self-body 
recognition processing?  
Starting from this question, in the Chapter 4 we investigate whether the E+ 
patients, who implicitly incorporate in their body schema the body parts of 
others, can be impaired in implicit and explicit self-body recognition processing. 
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Chapter 2 
 
The recognition of one’s own voice 
 
  
30 
 
2.1 The voice as a special stimulus 
Body, face and voice signals, despite the different nature of their physical 
structure, convey socially and personal relevant information, such as age, gender, 
emotional state and identity. Voice recognition is critical in several social 
contexts, for instance when we are at the phone or when someone talks from a 
different room and the visual stimuli that allow to recognize the other person are 
not available. The social relevance of voice recognition is reinforced by evidence 
of fetal recognition of mother‟s voice in utero (Kisilevsky et al., 2003) and by an 
increasing specialization of neural mechanisms for human voice over the first six 
months of development (Lloyd-Fox et al., 2012; Vouloumanos et al., 2010). 
Moreover, the existence of selective brain regions in the monkey (Petkov et al., 
2008) and in human brain (Belin et al., 2000) suggested that our conspecifics‟ 
vocalizations may be considered as special stimuli. Indeed, we are constantly 
expose to social interactions and conversations in which reciprocal verbal 
exchanges are predominant.  
Starting from this point of view, Belin and colleagues (2004) have recently 
updated a model on voice processing (for previous description see also Burton et 
al., 1990) in which the voice can be considered as an auditory face. They 
extended the Bruce and Young‟s seminal model of face processing (Bruce & 
Young, 1986; Young & Bruce, 2011) and hypothesized three different pathways 
involved in voice processing. Initially, a more general low-level analysis of 
voice occurs in the auditory cortex. After this preliminary stage, in order to 
develop a structural encoding of voice, three different types of information are 
extracted in three dissociable and interacting functional pathways: 
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1. A pathway for analysis of speech information involving STS and inferior 
prefrontal regions 
2. A pathway for analysis of vocal affective information involving temporo-medial 
regions, anterior insula and amygdala 
3. A pathway for analysis of vocal identity involving voice recognition units, each 
activated by one of the voices known to the person  
Finally, the authors proposed that these three pathways interact each other and 
with homologous pathways in the face-processing (see Figure 2.1). 
 
Figure 2.1 – The Bruce and Young’s model of voice perception. 
From Belin et al., (2004). 
 
Thus, according with the above mentioned model, despite faces and voices are 
very different sensory input, one visual and the other one acoustic, a unifying 
coding mechanism was proposed (Yovel & Belin, 2013). This similarity may be 
especially relevant during the face-voice integration processes. Indeed, in order 
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to correctly identify others people, it may be advantageous for the brain to 
integrate these sources of information. 
2.1.1 Anatomical correlates of voice processing 
Converging fMRI evidence suggested that voice–selective regions are mostly 
located along the superior temporal sulcus (STS) bilaterally (Belin et al., 2000; 
Ethofer et al., 2009; Gervais et al., 2004; Grandjean et al., 2005; Linden et al., 
2011). In this region the cerebral activity is greater in response to vocal than to 
non-vocal sounds.  
In order to verify the exact involvement of temporal areas in voice/non-voice 
discrimination ability, Bestelmeyer and colleagues (2011) adopted the rTMS 
which disrupt the ability of a small region of cortex, creating a temporary lesion. 
A group of neurologically healthy participants were submitted to two different 
tasks: a voice/non-voice discrimination task and a loud/quiet discrimination task. 
In the voice/non-voice discrimination task, participants were required to 
differentiate between vocal versus environmental sounds. In the loud/quiet 
discrimination task, participants were asked to discriminate between loud and 
quiet stimuli by pressing one of two buttons on a keyboard. Four pulses of rTMS 
at 10 Hz was applied on right temporal voice areas (TVA) and on supramarginal 
gyrus (SMG), chosen as a control site. The authors found that voice/non-voice 
discrimination ability was impaired when rTMS was targeted at the right TVA 
compared with the control site. Conversely, performance of the control task was 
not differentially affected by site of stimulation (see Figure 2.2). This finding 
provide the first direct link between TVA activity (especially in the right 
hemisphere) and voice detection ability.  
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Looking more deeply on STS‟ functional roles, several studies (Andics et al., 
2010; Belin and Zatorre, 2003; von Kriegstein & Giraud, 2004; Schall et al., 
2014) demonstrated the existence of different functional regions. Specifically, 
within the right hemisphere, the posterior part of the superior temporal sulcus 
(pSTS) is more closely related to the acoustical processing of vocal sound, 
whereas the anterior part of STS (aSTS) seems to be involved in voice identity 
processing. Furthermore, distinct functional roles emerged also across 
hemispheres: indeed, areas sensitive to verbal feature are mostly located in the 
left hemisphere, whereas cortical areas sensitive to voice identity are dominant in 
the right hemisphere (Bonte et al., 2009; Belin and Zatorre, 2003; Formisano et 
al., 2008; von Kriegstein et al., 2003). For instance, by means of the fMRI 
technique, von Kriegstein and colleagues (2003) investigated the cortical 
response to auditory sentences, comparing two recognition tasks that either 
Figure 2.2. - Functional role of the TVA in voice/non-voice discrimination 
(A) Illustration of stimulation sites adopted in Bestelmeyer et al., (2011) study‟s. Individually localised right 
temporal voice area in red; control site in green. (B) The mean accuracy in the experimental and control task as 
a function of the stimulation‟s site. rTMS applied on TVA caused significantly poorer performance compared 
with the control site on the voice/non-voice discrimination task From Bestelmeyer et al., (2011). 
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targeted the speaker‟s voice or the verbal content. In this study, German 
sentences pronounced by an unknown speaker were adopted as experimental 
stimuli. Therefore, participants were familiarized with the target voice and they 
were asked to pay attention to the speaker‟s voice or to the verbal content of the 
sentences. Focusing on the speaker‟s voice increased the activation of the right 
anterior STS and precuneus, whereas focusing on the verbal content increased 
the activation of the left posterior middle temporal region. These findings are in 
line with the previous described involvement of the right temporal region in 
voice processing. Concerning the precuneus, since previous studies found similar 
activations during episodic memory retrieval (Krause et al., 1999; Schmidt et al., 
2002), its recruitment likely reflects the difficulty of retaining the voice of an 
unknown speaker. On the other hand, the left temporal region is commonly 
associated with verbal semantic processing (Giraud et al., 2002; Kuperberg et al., 
2000). Overall, these results clearly demonstrate that distinct brain regions 
underlie voice identity and speech processing. 
2.2 Mechanisms underlying self-voice processing  
There is mounting evidence suggesting that self-perception is special and 
involves systems that are physically and functionally different from those 
involved in the perception of familiar and unfamiliar stimuli. Although in this 
field the processing of one‟s own face has received most of the attention (Platek 
et al., 2004, 2006; Sugiura et al., 2005; Turk et al., 2002), more recent findings 
suggest that the one‟s own voice may be considered a special stimulus too. 
Accordingly, behavioural and neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that 
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processing the one‟s own compared to familiar or unfamiliar voice is subtended 
by distinct processes and recruits different neural networks. 
A first attempt aimed to highlight brain regions associated with self and familiar 
voice recognition, has been carried out by Nakamura and colleagues (2001). 
They measured regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) by positron emission 
tomography (PET). This technique allows to identify changes expressed as 
increase or decrease of the rCBF during two experimental tasks. Stimuli were 
Japanese sentences spoken by participant or by a familiar or unfamiliar person, 
and were binaurally presented via a pair of stereo earphones. Therefore, each 
participant was submitted to three different tasks: a familiar-unfamiliar voice 
discrimination, a self-unfamiliar voice discrimination and a vowel 
discrimination, designed as a control task. They found that discriminating 
between self and familiar voices was associated with different brain regions. 
Specifically, greater activity in frontal regions, such as the right inferior frontal 
sulcus and the parainsular cortex was found during the “Self voice” task. The 
authors suggest that this network reflects a retrieval effort, since participant have 
memory of one‟s own voice, that may be different from the recorded voice. 
Furthermore, discriminating between familiar and unfamiliar voices was 
associated with activations on both the left and right hemisphere. Indeed, 
activations of left precuneus and left frontal pole may reflect the involvement of 
episodic memory functions. On the right hemisphere, authors found activations 
in the enthorinal cortex and temporal pole. Since a previous study demonstrated 
that the temporal pole was activated when participants listen to sentences 
containing information related to the participant‟s own past (Fink et al., 1996), 
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the authors suggested this region could represent a storehouse for auditory 
personal memory.  
The discrimination between self and familiar voice was also investigated in an 
event-related fMRI study by Kaplan and colleague (2008). Participants were 
scanned while they viewing faces and listened to voices stimuli which could 
belong to the participant or to a familiar person (namely, a friend of the same 
race and the same gender). Thus, for each stimulus category a comparison 
between two conditions: “self” and “other-familiar” was carried out. When 
hearing one‟s own voice is compared with the voice of a familiar other, greater 
activity was found in the anterior part of the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) in the 
right hemisphere. Moreover, viewing one‟s own face compared with a familiar 
other face is associated with activation of the parietal, occipital and inferior 
frontal lobe in the right hemisphere. The authors concluded that processing self-
related stimuli across multiple sensory modalities involve a shared neural 
substrates, in which the right inferior frontal lobe may represents a key region in 
order to extract an abstract representation of the self. 
The above findings are further supported by a behavioural study in which 
functional asymmetries related to self-voice recognition were investigated. 
Participants were presented with continua of auditory morphs between either 
their own (self) or a familiar voice and a famous voice, and were asked to stop 
the presentation either when the voice became „„more famous” or „„more 
familiar/self” with the right or left hand. Authors demonstrated that a difference 
emerged between right and left hands only for self-voice, but not for famous and 
for familiar voice. Indeed, when participants responded with the left-hand 
needed a smaller percentage of self to recognize their own voice and stop the 
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presentation. This lateralized effect suggests a right hemisphere facilitation for 
processing self-related stimuli in the domain of voice, similar to what has been 
observed in the visual domain for self-faces (Keenan et al., 1999, 2000). 
More recently, two studies investigated the neural correlates of self-voice 
processing by using an electrophysiological approach (Graux et al., 2013, 2015). 
Authors hypothesized that P3a and the mismatch negativity (MMN) responses 
elicited in the auditory cortex might be sensitive to discriminate between self  
and unknown voices. Participants were instructed to watch a silent movie on a 
TV screen and to pay attention to the story. They were not aware that they were 
going to hear distinct voices. Indeed, the authors adopted an auditory oddball 
paradigm during EEG recording using self and unfamiliar voices as stimuli. As a 
result, the P3a clearly distinguished between the self and the unknown voice 
since its amplitude was smaller for the one‟s own voice than for unfamiliar 
voice. Furthermore, detection of one‟ own voice was associated with an early 
response (“pre-MMN”) which occurred 70 ms post-stimulus onset over the left 
frontal region. These results suggested that the passive discrimination of one‟ 
own voice involves neural processes that are different from those involved in 
discrimination of unknown voices.  
In a subsequent study, Graux and colleagues (2015) further investigated whether 
the specificity found for the self-voice compared to unknown voices may be 
simply ascribed to a familiarity effect for the one‟s own voice. In order to 
disentangle this possibility, they submitted a group of healthy participants to the 
same task previously adopted (Graux et al., 2013) using self, familiar and 
unfamiliar voices as stimuli. Interestingly, they reported a P3a amplitude smaller 
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for self than familiar voice confirming that the processes involved in the 
perception of familiar and non-familiar voices were different.  
Most of the previous named studies about self-voice recognition used a paradigm 
of explicit recognition. However, in the domain of self-recognition, there is 
much evidence suggesting a dissociation between implicit and explicit self-
processing. For example it was recently demonstrated an intriguing dissociation 
between implicit and explicit self-body recognition. (Ferri et al., 2011; 
Frassinetti et al., 2011). Thus, aim of the study presented in Chapter 5 is to verify 
whether also for the voice there is a dissociation between implicit and explicit 
self-voice recognition in a group of neurologically healthy participants.  
2.3 Voice recognition disorders following brain lesion 
As has been already pointed out in the previous section, voice recognition is a 
key skill in social context. However, due to brain lesions, such as stroke or 
injury, abilities in recognizing familiar persons can be lost. In literature there are 
only a few case reports on voice identity recognition deficits. This is surprising 
because voice identity recognition impairments in patients with brain lesions are 
frequent (Neuner & Schweinberger, 2000). One reason for this lack of studies 
might be that voice identity recognition tests are not as readily available as face-
identity recognition tests. Furthermore, voice identity recognition deficits might 
not be as socially impairing as face-identity recognition deficits.  
The first line of research concerned the inability to recognize familiar voices. To 
refer to this particular condition has been coin the term of acquired phonagnosia, 
in which patient shows the inability to recognize familiar people on the basis of 
their voice (Van Lancker et al., 1989; Van Lancker & Canter, 1982). This 
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condition is similar to the one described for face stimuli, that is the 
prosopagnosia in which, following a bilateral lesion of occipitotemporal medial 
cortex, patient is impaired in person recognition on the basis of their face 
(Damasio et al., 1982; Meadows, 1974).  
Our ability to identify other people is associated with the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex (vmPFC), that is activated by viewing familiar faces or imagining familiar 
voices and that, for this reason, can be considered a person identification node 
(PIN, Bruce & Young, 1986) Recently, some authors suggested that 
prosopagnosia and phonagnosia occur not only as a failure in recognition of 
familiarity, based on face or voice, but these conditions are due to a deficit in the 
white matter connections between vmPFC and face-and prosody-selective areas, 
respectively (Biederman et al., 2015). 
Furthermore, two other studies describe a deficit in voice identity recognition 
following a brain lesion (Peretz et al., 1994; Van Lancker et al., 1988). They 
showed that recognizing a familiar voice and discriminating among unfamiliar 
voices are different abilities. Indeed, familiar voice recognition involves mainly 
the right hemisphere, whereas voice discrimination involves both hemispheres. 
Specifically, recognition of familiar voices is impaired by damage to the right 
inferior and lateral parietal lobe, whereas deficit in voice discrimination is 
associated with temporal lobe damage of either hemispheres (Van Lancker & 
Canter, 1982; Van Lancker et al., 1989).  
To sum up, the evidence here reported suggested that an impairment in voice-
recognition is associated with right brain damage. This findings is interesting 
since, as previously described (Chapter 1), also in the domain of bodily self, 
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following a right hemisphere lesion a deficit may occur in recognize the one‟s 
own body (Frassinetti et al., 2008, 2009, 2010).  
Starting from these evidence, the study presented in Chapter 6 aimed at 
investigate the self-voice recognition disorder using a neuropsychological 
approach.  
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Thesis overview  
The aim of the current thesis is to investigate the mechanisms underlying the 
recognition of the corporeal self. The research presented here can be subdivided 
into two main parts: the first one focuses on one‟s own body processing in 
healthy and clinical populations.  
Growing evidence suggested that we have an implicit knowledge about our 
body. Indeed, when performing a visual matching task with picture of body-parts 
belonged to the participant or to other people, neurologically healthy individuals 
showed the so-called self-advantage effect, that‟s a better performance when self 
than others stimuli were presented. Conversely, since this facilitation was not 
observed when an explicit self-body recognition is required, it has been 
suggested that we may access to our bodily knowledge by means of two different 
routes: an implicit and an explicit one. Furthermore, neuropsychological 
evidence suggested that the right hemisphere is crucial in the implicit recognition 
of self body-parts. By contrast, much less is known on the explicit recognition of 
bodily self. To this aim, in Study 1 implicit and explicit dissociations in bodily 
self-recognition were investigated in right and left brain damaged patients. 
Participants were presented with rotated pictures of either self or other people 
hands. In the Implicit task participants were submitted to the hand laterality task, 
whereas in the Explicit task they had to judge whether the hand belonged or not, 
to them. Furthermore, the selective impairment of implicit and/or explicit bodily 
self-processing was investigated by comparing each patient with a sample of 
neurologically healthy individuals. Finally, the neural basis of such a 
dissociation was revealed by means of the Voxel-based lesion-symptom 
mapping analysis. 
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In Study 2 an intriguing question concerning the relationship between the bodily 
self-recognition and the embodiment is investigated. Indeed, it has been recently 
described a groups of patients with a focal brain lesion claiming that the 
examiner‟s hand is their own hand, showing a pathological embodiment of 
other‟s body-parts. This phenomenon typically occurs following a lesion of the 
right hemisphere and demonstrates that the sense of body-ownership is altered 
following brain damage. In order to address whether an altered sense of bodily 
ownership may impair the ability to properly distinguish between what belong to 
the self and to other people‟ body-parts, we adopted two experimental tasks 
designed for testing implicit (a visual matching to sample task) and explicit 
bodily self-recognition. The Study 2 address this critical question by comparing 
right brain damaged patients with and without pathological embodiment and a 
group of neurologically healthy controls.   
The second part will be focused on self-voice recognition in healthy and clinical 
populations. In the domain of self-recognition, voice is a critical feature for self-
other distinction. In Study 3, we explore whether people have an implicit and 
explicit knowledge of their voice. A group of neurologically healthy participants 
were submitted to an implicit and an explicit self-voice recognition task. They 
listened to pairs of pre-recorded auditory stimuli (words or pseudowords) 
pronounced by themselves, by a familiar or an unfamiliar person. Afterwards, in 
the Implicit task participants had to judge whether the pair of stimuli were 
pronounced by same or different speakers, whereas in the Explicit task they had 
to identify if one of the paired stimuli was or not their own voice.  
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Finally, the neural correlates of implicit and explicit self-voice recognition were 
explored in Study 4 by comparing left and right brain damaged patients at the 
Implicit and Explicit tasks above described.  
The general discussion draws together the findings from all of the above studies 
and suggests directions for future research.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Implicit and explicit routes to recognize the 
own body: evidence from brain damaged 
patients 
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3.1 Introduction 
The body, including its various parts, is an important component of our self and 
its identity and one of its most distinctive physical features. Previous studies 
showed that the recognition of a body (or body-parts) as one‟s own body 
depends on a multitude of information. These studies suggest that the common 
feeling that what I am looking at is my body results from the simultaneous 
processing of visual components (Devue et al., 2007; Sugiura et al., 2005), 
somatosensory and proprioceptive signals (for a review see Blanke, 2012), and 
motor information (Frassinetti et al., 2009; Sugiura et al., 2006). Starting from 
this evidence here we focus on the contribution of visual and motor information 
to bodily self-processing. A relevant distinction has been recently made in the 
field between implicit and explicit body knowledge. In this respect, Frassinetti 
and colleagues (2008, 2009, 2010) investigated the implicit recognition of self 
body-parts, by using a visual matching to sample task. Participants were required 
to decide which of two vertically aligned images (high or low) matched the 
central target stimulus (i.e., an Implicit task). Stimuli could depict participants‟ 
or other people‟s body-parts (hand, foot, arm, leg). Results showed that 
participants were more accurate with self rather than others‟ body-parts. This 
facilitation was called self-advantage effect. Interestingly, the self-advantage 
effect was not found when participants were explicitly required to judge whether 
the upper or the lower stimulus corresponded to their own body-parts (Frassinetti 
et al., 2011). This suggests possible dissociation between implicit and explicit 
self-advantage effect. However, neither such implicit-explicit dissociation in the 
self-advantage effect nor its underlying neural correlates have been demonstrated 
so far in brain damaged patients. 
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To better investigate the mechanisms of the implicit and explicit bodily self-
recognition, in a following study (Ferri et al., 2011) the authors adopted a 
laterality judgment task, instead of the visual matching task. In a first experiment 
(implicit), participants were requested to report the laterality of images depicting 
self or other‟s hands presented at different angular orientations, whereas in the 
second experiment (explicit), participants were asked to recognize their own 
hand (Ferri et al., 2011). In order to perform the former but not the latter task, 
participants simulated a motor rotation of their own body-parts so as to match 
that of the observed stimulus (Ionta et al., 2007, 2012). In the laterality judgment 
task, a facilitatory effect (i.e., faster response times) was found in response to 
hand stimuli belonging to the participants (self stimuli), suggesting that the body 
self-advantage is based on a sensorimotor representation. This facilitatory effect 
was not observed in the second task, that is, during the explicit discrimination 
between self and others‟ stimuli. Overall, these results raise the possibility that 
bodily self-recognition is based on, at least, two different mechanisms for the 
implicit and explicit self-body processing, subtended by two different cerebral 
networks. As a consequence, different brain lesions might selectively impair 
either the implicit or the explicit self-body processing. 
More specifically, we are confronted with the following alternatives. If implicit 
and explicit bodily processing are mediated by different neural networks, 
patients showing impairments in the Implicit task should be unimpaired in the 
explicit self body-parts recognition, unless the brain regions involved in body-
parts explicit recognition are also damaged by the lesion. If, in contrast, implicit 
and explicit self body-parts recognition is mediated by the same network, 
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patients impaired in the implicit should be impaired also in the explicit self 
body-parts recognition. 
To test these hypotheses, patients with focal cerebral lesion (20 RBD and 13 
LBD patients) and a group of healthy subjects were recruited and asked to 
perform two experiments. 
In the first experiment participants were submitted to a laterality judgment task 
of rotated hands with different angular orientation (Implicit task). In the second 
experiment they were asked to explicitly recognize their own hand (Explicit 
task) (see Ferri et al., 2011 for the experimental paradigm). In both experiments, 
the displayed hand was the participants‟ hand (self condition) in half of the trials, 
whereas it depicted other people‟s hand (other condition) in the rest of the trials.  
Based on previous studies, using the visual matching task, which showed that the 
self-advantage effect is preserved only in LBD patients (Frassinetti et al., 2008), 
we hypothesized the following results. In the Implicit task, a self-advantage 
effect should be found in LBD patients (Frassinetti et al., 2010), in addition to 
controls (Ferri et al., 2011, 2012), but not in RBD patients (Frassinetti et al., 
2008, 2009, 2010). In the Explicit task, no self-advantage effect is predicted in 
healthy subjects, as well as in patients. Moreover, the observation of double 
dissociations between implicit and explicit bodily self-recognition together with 
the Voxel-based lesion-symptom mapping analysis will provide further evidence 
that these two aspects are functionally and anatomically distinct.  
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3.2 Materials and methods 
3.2.1 Participants and neuropsychological assessment 
Twenty RBD patients (11 males, age = 60.4±11 years; education = 10.9±4.7 
years) and fourteen LBD patients (10 males, age = 60.3±10 years; education = 
8.9±2.7 years) participated in the study. All patients were right handed by their 
own verbal report and were assessed for the presence of a general cognitive 
impairment through the Mini-Mental State Examination (Folstein et al., 1975). 
Twenty healthy participants matched for age (7 male, age = 53.7±11.6 years; 
education = 12.8±3.6 years) and handedness served as controls. Two one-way 
ANOVAs confirmed that the three groups were not significantly different for age 
[F(2,50)=2.09, p=.13] and education [F(2,50)=2.87, p=.07].  
The presence and severity of extrapersonal neglect (Bell‟s Cancellation test; 
Gauthier et al., 1989), personal neglect (Fluff Test; Cocchini et al., 2001) and 
anosognosia for hemiplegia and hemianestesia (Spinazzola et al., 2008) were 
also assessed (for details see Table 3.1).  
Patients were recruited at the Fondazione Maugeri Hospital (Castel Goffredo, 
Italy) and at the Villa Bellombra Rehabilitation Hospital (Bologna, Italy).  
All participants, naive to the purpose of the study, gave their informed consent to 
participate to the study. The study was approved by the local ethics committee 
(Villa Bellombra Hospital and Department of Psychology of Bologna), and all 
procedures were in agreement with the 2008 Helsinki Declaration. 
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Table 3.1 - Clinical and neuropsychological data of right (a) and left brain damaged patients (b). 
a)       
 ID Age TPL Aetiology MMSE* Bells ** Fluff  AHP*** AHE*** 
 RBD 1 79 60 I 30 5 2 0 0 
 RBD 2 73 39 I 30 0 0 0 0 
 RBD 3 48 19 I - 5 1 0 0 
 RBD 4 39 228 I - 2 1 0 0 
 RBD 5 69 34 I 24 4 1 0 0 
 RBD 6 58 60 I - - - 0 0 
 RBD 7 57 650 I - 3 0 0 0 
 RBD 8 59 50 I - 0 0 0 0 
 RBD 9 56 59 I - 0 2 0 0 
 RBD 10 62 30 I 28 0 2 0 0 
 RBD 11 54 392 H 28 2 1 0 0 
 RBD 12 64 84 I - 2 2 0 0 
 RBD 13 71 39 I 22 15 0 0 0 
 RBD 14 65 73 H 24 14 10 1 1 
 RBD 15 57 88 I - 6 0 0 0 
 RBD 16 61 37 I - 0   0 0 1 
 RBD 17 64 79 H 23 12 5 0 2 
 RBD 18 68 16 I 28 0 1 0 0 
 RBD 19 34 50 H 30 0 1 0 0 
 RBD 20 69 43 I 26 4 1 0 0 
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b) ID Age TPL Aetiology MMSE* Token Test    
      
 LBD 1 51 82 H - 29    
 LBD 2 65 70 H - -    
 LBD 3 44 93 H 27 26    
 LBD 4 57 25 I 22 33    
 LBD 5 64 277 I 27 29    
 LBD 6 77 43 I 28 -    
 LBD 7 67 52 I 22 26    
 LBD 8 51 34 H 27 32    
 LBD 9 47 51 I 24 30    
 LBD 10 61 47 H 30 34    
 LBD 11 52 35 H 25 30    
 LBD 12 71 33 H 27 36    
 LBD 13 63 31 I 28 32    
 LBD 14 72 28 H 20 22    
 
TPL = Time post lesion (days); I = ischemic stroke, H= hemorrhagic stroke; *MMSE= 
Mini Mental State Examination (scores are corrected for years of education and age); 
**Bells Test= left omissions; Fluff test= omissions; ***AHP= anosognosia for 
hemiplegia; ***AHE= anosognosia for hemianestesia (scoring 0= no anosognosia, 1= 
moderate anosognosia, 2=severe anosognosia, each value refers to the left upper limb). 
Bold characters indicated pathological performance. 
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3.2.2 Stimuli and procedure 
Grey-scale pictures of the dorsal view of right and left hands (see Figure 3.1) 
were used as experimental stimuli. The hands of each participant were 
photographed with a digital camera in a session prior to the experiments. Hands 
were always photographed with constant artificial light, in the same position and 
at a fixed distance from the camera (40 cm).  
Pictures were modified with Adobe Photoshop® CS4 software: each hand was 
cut from the original picture, centered and then pasted on a white background. 
Finally, each photograph was clockwise rotated to obtain six predefined 
orientation (0°, 60°, 120°, 180°, 240°, 300°), in which fingers pointing upwards 
defined the upright orientation. Half of the trials (n=144) depicted the 
participant‟s own left or right hand („self‟ trials), whereas the other half depicted 
the right or left hand of three other people („other‟ trials). As far as the latter one, 
three stimuli were selected from a database of hands pictures as the best match 
with each participant‟s hand for size, age, skin color and gender. 
 
Figure 3.1 - An example of stimuli representing hands at different orientations.  
In the Implicit task, participants were required to judge the laterality of each stimulus. In the Explicit task, 
participants were required to judge if the hand was or was not their own. 
 
Participants sat in front of a PC screen, at a viewing distance of about 40 cm. A 
central fixation cross (500 ms duration) was presented at the beginning of each 
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trial followed by a display containing hand‟s picture on a white background. 
Stimuli presentation was controlled by E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools 
Inc.) and each trial was timed-out by the participant‟s response (up to 4000 ms).   
In Experiment 1 participants had to judge the laterality (left or right) of displayed 
hand by pressing as accurately as possible and within the allowed time interval, a 
left or a right response key (“R” or “P” on keyboard). In Experiment 2, 
participants had to explicitly judge whether the displayed hand corresponded or 
not to their own hand by pressing as accurately as possible and within the 
allowed time interval, a left or a right previously assigned response key (“R” or 
“P” on keyboard). In both Experiments the response keys were counterbalanced 
between subjects. Since patients responded by using their not affected hand, 
that‟s the left for RBD and the right for LBD, healthy subjects were accordingly 
divided in two groups: 9 who responded by using the index finger of the right 
hand, and 11 who using their left hand. 
An adapted version of both experiments to patients showing signs of neglect or 
left hemianopia was designed by shifting all stimuli to the right side of the 
screen. Analogously, an adapted version of both experiments to patients showing 
right hemianopia was designed by shifting all stimuli to the left side of the 
screen. 
Both experiments were always preceded by 8 trials as practice. Then, each 
experiment comprised 288 trials, 72 trials for each of the four conditions: self-
right hand, self-left hand, other-right hand, other-left hand. Furthermore, each 
orientation was randomly presented 12 times per condition. Since Experiment 1 
investigated the implicit and Experiment 2 the explicit bodily self-recognition, 
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Experiment 1 was always conducted before Experiment 2. All participants 
performed both experiments in one single session lasting up to one hour. 
3.2.3 Statistical analyses  
Data from Experiment 1 (Implicit task) and Experiment 2 (Explicit task) were 
analyzed separately. First of all, the presence of the self-advantage effect and the 
strategy to solve the task (i.e., the mental rotation) were tested in healthy 
subjects. An ANOVA was conducted on mean response times (RTs) for correct 
trials with Owner (self and other), Laterality (left and right) and Orientation (0°, 
60°, 120°, 180°, 240°, 300°) as within-subjects factors and Group (H-R= healthy 
subjects responding with the right finger and H-L= healthy subjects responding 
with the left finger) as between-subjects factor. Finally, to directly compare 
healthy subjects‟ and patients‟ performance two separate ANOVAs were 
conducted: the first, between RBD patients and healthy subjects responding with 
the right finger (H-R); the second, between LBD patients and healthy subjects 
responding with the left finger (H-L). When the variable Group was significant, 
patients‟ data were also separately analyzed.  
The same ANOVAs were also conducted on mean correct responses (accuracy), 
collapsing the Orientation factor across conditions. Where necessary, post-hoc 
analyses were conducted by using Tukey‟s HSD (Honest Significant Difference) 
test for equal or unequal N (in accordance with the sample size). The magnitude 
of effect size was expressed by η2p. 
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3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Analysis on mean response times (RTs) 
Results of Experiment 1 (Implicit task) 
 
 Analysis on healthy subjects  
The Laterality x Owner interaction was significant [F(1,18)=7.75 p<.01; η2p 
=.30]: participants responded faster with self than with other people‟s right hand 
(self=1079 ms vs. other=1156 ms, p<.02), whereas no significant difference was 
found for the left hand (self=1191 ms vs. other=1174 ms, p=.87). Moreover, a 
significant difference emerged between right and left self hand (p<.001) but not 
right and left others‟ hand (p=.87). In addition, when participants responded to 
their right hand were faster compared to other left hand (p<.003, see Figure 
3.2a).  
The main effect Orientation was significant [F(5,90)=26.23 p<.0001; η2p =.59], 
since RTs to stimuli at 180° (1386 ms) were longer than all other orientations 
(0°=1017 ms, 60°=1046 ms, 120°=1217 ms, 240°=1188 ms, 300°=1046 ms, 
p<.001 in all cases). Moreover, longer RTs were observed at 120° and 240° 
compared to RTs at 0°, 60° and 300°, p<.008 for all comparisons, see Figure 
3.4). These results show that participants used mental rotation strategy to solve 
the Implicit task, both for right and left stimuli.  
The variable Group and its interaction with other variables were not significant, 
suggesting that the responding hand did not influence the described effects.  
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RBD patients and healthy subjects responding with the right finger (H-R) 
The variable Group was significant [F(1,27)=10.86, p<.003; η2p =.29], which 
was mainly due to longer response time in RBD patients (1725 ms) compared to 
controls (1213 ms).  
The main effect of Orientation was significant [F(5,135)=28.23, p<.0001; η2p 
=.51] since RTs were longer at 180° (1856 ms) than at all other orientations 
(0°=1419 ms, 60°=1486 ms, 120°=1685 ms, 240°=1610 ms, 300°=1472 ms, 
p<.0004 in all cases). Moreover, longer RTs were observed at 120° and 240° 
compared to RTs at 0°, 60° and 300°, p<.0001 for all comparisons).  
The interaction Laterality x Orientation was significant [F(5,135)=3.08, p<.01; 
η2p =.10]. Post-hoc analysis showed that RBD patients performed slower with 
the left compared to the right hand at 0° (1506 ms vs. 1333 ms, p<.004) and at 
300° (1560 ms vs. 1384 ms, p<.003).  
Then, as slower performance with the left compared to the right hand was not 
observed in healthy subject, we wanted to test whether the significant interaction 
was mainly due to a specific effect of the patients‟ contralesional left hand. To 
this aim, being the variable Group significant a separate ANOVA was conducted 
on RBD patients‟ performance with Owner, Laterality and Orientation as within-
subjects variables.  
Analysis on RBD patients 
First of all, analysis showed that the variable Owner (p=.14) and its interactions 
with other variables were not significant. These results confirmed that RBD 
patients, differently from healthy subjects, did not show the self-advantage effect 
(see Figure 3.3a).  
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The variable Orientation [F(5,95)=20.27, p<.0001; η2p =.52] and the crucial 
interaction Laterality x Orientation were significant [F(5,95)=5.47, p<.0002; 
η2p =.22]. Post-hoc analysis confirmed that RBD patients used the mental 
rotation strategy to solve the task both for the right hand (180°=2056 ms vs. 
0°=1468 ms, 60°=1679 ms, 240°=1725 ms, 300°=1550 ms, p<.0001 for all 
comparisons) and for the left hand (180°=1981 ms vs. 0°=1693 ms, 60°=1651 
ms, 300°=1755 ms, p<.01 for all comparisons, see Figure 3.4). Moreover, this 
analysis revealed that RBD patients performed slower with the left 
(controlesional) hand compared to the right (ipsilesional) hand at 0° (1506 ms vs. 
1333 ms, p<.004) and at 300° (1560 ms vs. 1384 ms, p<.003). 
 
LBD patients and healthy subjects responding with the left finger (H-L) 
The variable Group was significant [F(1,23)=22.11 p<.0001; η2p=.49]: LBD 
patients showed longer response time (1836 ms) compared to controls (1099 
ms).  
The variable Owner was significant [F(1,23) =8.85, p<.007; η2p=.28]: RTs were 
faster for self (1473 ms) than other people‟s (1550 ms) body-parts processing.  
The variable Orientation was significant [F(5,115)=21.96, p<.0001; η2p=.49] 
since RTs to stimuli at 180° (1787 ms) were longer than all the other orientations 
(0°=1386 ms, 60°=1399 ms, 120°=1574 ms, 240°=1520 ms, 300°=1402 ms, 
p<.00023 in all cases) and RTs to stimuli at 120° were longer than at 0°-60°-
300° orientations (p<.002). 
Analysis on LBD patients 
A separate ANOVA conducted on LBD patients‟ data showed a significant 
effect of the variable Owner [F(1,13) =6.52, p<.02; η2p=.33]: patients performed 
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faster with self (1786 ms) compared to other‟s body-parts (1886 ms) (see Figure 
3.3b).  
Also the Orientation was significant [F(5,65)=13.456, p<.0001; η2p=.51]: RTs 
to stimuli at 180° (2174 ms) were longer than at all other orientations (0°=1706 
ms, 60°=1711 ms, 120°=1893 ms, 240°=1835 ms, 300°=1696 ms, p<.002 in all 
cases, see Figure 3.4). Since the interaction Laterality x Orientation was not 
significant (p=.71), LBD patients used the mental rotation strategy to solve the 
task with the same efficiency with the right (contralesional) and left 
(ipsilesional) hand.  
 
Figure 3.2 – Mean RTs of Controls in the Implicit and Explicit task.  
The mean of RTs in the Implicit and Explicit task as a function of Ownership (Self, Other) and Laterality 
(left and right hand) respectively. Differences significant at p<.05 are starred. Error bars depict SEMs.  
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Figure 3.3 – Mean RTs of Controls, RBD and LBD patients in the Implicit task.  
Results are displayed as a function of orientations and laterality separately for self and other‟s hand. 
Differences significant at p<.05 are starred. Error bars depict SEMs.  
 
Results of Experiment 2 (Explicit task) 
 
Analysis on healthy subjects  
The main effect of Owner was significant [F(1,18)=4.4 p<.05; η2p =.21]: RTs 
were longer for  self than for other people‟s stimuli (self-disadvantage, self=917 
ms vs. other=823 ms; see Figure 3.2b).  
The variable Orientation was not significant (p=.38), suggesting that participants 
did not use mental rotation strategy to solve the Explicit task (0°=839 ms, 
60°=866 ms, 120°=880 ms, 180°= 893 ms, 240°=873 ms, 300°=875 ms, see 
Figure 3.5). 
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RBD patients and healthy subjects responding with the right finger (H-R) 
The variable Group was significant [F(1,27)=32, p<.0001; η2p=.55]: RBD 
patients responded slower (1573 ms) than healthy subjects (872 ms).  
The variable Owner [F(1,27) =7.35, p<.01; η2p=.22] was significant showing a 
self-disadvantage effect (self=1550 ms vs. other=1165 ms). The interaction 
Owner x Group was significant [F(1,27) =3.89, p<.05; η2p=.13] since RBD 
patients with self stimuli (1820 ms) were slower than controls (both with 
self=854 ms and other=776 ms stimuli) whereas RBD patients with other‟s 
stimuli were not significantly different from controls. 
Finally, the variable Orientation (p=.73, see Figure 3.5), as well as its 
interactions with other variables were not significant. 
Analysis on RBD patients 
When RBD patients‟ data were separately analyzed only the variable Owner 
[F(1,19) =14.48, p<.001; η2p=.43] was significant confirming a disadvantage for 
self-stimuli (1821 ms vs 1325 ms) (see Figure 3.3c).  
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LBD patients and healthy subjects responding with the left finger (H-L) 
The variable Group was significant [F(1,23)=28.25, p<.0001; η2p=.55]: LBD 
patients (1510 ms) were slower than controls (868 ms). The variable Owner was 
significant [F(1,23)=8.81, p<.01; η2p=.28] showing a self-disadvantage effect 
(self=1299 ms vs. other=1133 ms). The variable Orientation (p=.20), as well as 
its interactions with other variables were not significant (see Figure 3.5). 
Analysis on LBD patients 
When LBD patients‟ data were separately analyzed only the variable Owner 
[F(1,13) =8.07, p<.01; η2p=.38] was significant: patients were slower for self 
(1641 ms) compared to other‟s body-parts (1378 ms; see Figure 3.3d).  
 
Figure 3.4 – Mean RTs of RBD and LBD patients in the Implicit and Explicit task. 
The mean of RTs in the Implicit (upper panel) and Explicit task (lower panel) as a function of Ownership 
(Self, Other) respectively for RBD and LBD patients. Differences significant at p<.05 are starred. Error bars 
depict SEMs.   
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Figure 3.5 – Mean RTs of Controls, RBD and LBD patients in the Explicit task. 
Results are displayed as a function of orientations and laterality, separately for self and other‟s hand. 
Differences significant at p<.05 are starred. Error bars depict SEMs.  
 
3.3.2 Analysis on accuracy  
Since, the analysis conducted on response times including the Orientation factor, 
demonstrated that the Experiment 1, but not the Experiment 2, required a mental 
rotation strategy, in the further analysis the Orientation factor was collapsed 
across conditions.  
Data of Experiment 1 (Implicit task) and of Experiment 2 (Explicit task) were 
separately analyzed. 
First of all, to characterize the performance of healthy subjects, an ANOVA was 
conducted on the means of correct responses (Accuracy) with Owner (self and 
other) and Laterality (left and right displayed hand) as within-subjects factors 
and Group (H-R= healthy subjects responding with the right finger and H-L= 
healthy subjects responding with the left finger) as between-subjects factor. 
Finally, healthy subjects‟ and patients‟ performances were compared by using 
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two separate ANOVAs: the former between right brain damage patients (RBD) 
and healthy subjects responding with the right finger (H-R), and the latter 
between left brain damage patients (LBD) and healthy subjects responding with 
the left finger (H-L).  
Where necessary, post-hoc analyses were conducted by using Tukey‟s HSD 
(Honest Significant Difference) test for equal or unequal N (in accordance with 
the sample size). The magnitude of size effect was expressed by η2p. 
 
Results of Experiment 1 (Implicit task) 
 
Analysis on healthy subjects  
The Laterality x Owner interaction was significant F[(1,18)=26.8 p<.0001; η2p 
=.60]: participants were more accurate with self right hand than with others‟ 
right hand (self=94% vs. other=90%, p<.01) and than with self left hand (89%, 
p<.001). 
The variable Group and its interaction with other variables were not significant. 
 
RBD patients and healthy subjects responding with the right finger (H-R) 
The variable Group was significant [F(1,27)=21.7, p<.0001; η2p =.45], because 
controls were more accurate than RBD patients (94% vs 68%).  
The interaction Laterality x Group was near to be significant  [F(1,27)=3.54, 
p=.07]. To better understand the meaning of this effect, the same analysis was 
conducted on RBD patients‟ data separately. This analysis revealed that in RBD 
patients the variable Owner (self=69% vs Other=68%, p =.37) and its interaction 
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with laterality were far to be significant (self right=67%, self left=71%, other 
right=68%, other left=67%, p=.29). 
 
LBD patients and healthy subjects responding with the left finger (H-L) 
The variable Group was significant [F(1,22)=11.59, p<.002; η2p=.35]: controls 
were more accurate than LBD patients (89% vs. 70%). 
The Laterality x Owner interaction was significant F[(1,22)=5.51, p<.03; 
η2p=.20]: participants were more accurate with self right hand (83%) than with 
others‟ right hand (77%, p<.04) and with self left hand (77%, p<.03). 
The interaction between Group and the other variables were not significant.  
 
Results of Experiment 2 (Explicit task) 
Analysis on healthy subjects  
The main effect of Owner was significant F[(1,18)=4.9, p<.04; η2p=.21]: 
participants were less accurate with self than with others‟ stimuli (self-
disadvantage, self=86%  vs. other=92%).  
 
RBD patients and healthy subjects responding with the right finger (H-R) 
The variable Group was significant [F(1,27)=33.5, p<.0001; η2p=.55]: controls 
were more accurate than RBD patients (90% vs. 55%). 
The variable Owner [F(1,27) =11.26, p<.002; η2p=.29] was significant showing 
a self-disadvantage effect (self=52% vs. other=80%). The interaction Owner x 
Group was significant [F(1,27) =3.82, p<.05; η2p=.13] since the self-
disadvantage effect was significant only in RBD patients (self=36% vs. 
other=74%,  p<.0005). Moreover, RBD patients with self stimuli (36%) were 
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less accurate than controls (both with self=85% and other=94% stimuli, p<.0004 
for both comparisons) whereas RBD patients with other‟s stimuli were not 
significantly different from controls. 
 
LBD patients and healthy subjects responding with the left finger (H-L)       
The variable Group was significant [F(1,22)=11.1, p<.003; η2p=.34]: controls 
(88%) were more accurate than LBD patients (68%). The variable Owner was 
significant [F(1,22)=5.12, p<.04; η2p=.67] showing a self-disadvantage effect 
(self=71% vs. other=83%).  
The interaction Group x Owner was not significant (p=.13): the self-
disadvantage effect was present also in LBD patients (self=58% vs. other=78%). 
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3.4 Lesion study 
Brain lesions were identified by Computed Tomography and Magnetic 
Resonance digitalized images (CT/RMI) of 15 RBD and 11 LBD patients. For 
each patient, the location and extent of brain damage was delineated and 
manually mapped in the stereotactic space of the MNI by using the free software 
MRIcro (Rorden & Brett, 2000).  
As first step, MNI template was rotated (pitch only) to approximate the slice 
plane of the patient‟s scan. A trained rater (MC), using anatomically landmarks, 
manually mapped the lesion onto each correspondent template slice. After that, 
drawn lesions were inspected by a second trained rater (FF) and in case of 
disagreement, an intersection lesion map was used. Finally, lesions maps were 
rotated back into the standard space applying the inverse of the transformation 
parameters used on the stage of adaptation to the brain scan. 
 
3.4.1. Lesion overlap  
To localize and to measure the lesion extension of the two patients‟ groups, the 
lesion of RBD and of LBD patients were separately overlaid on the ch2 template 
provided by MRIcro and the region of maximum overlap was extracted.  
The region, that contained the overlap of at least 50% of RBD patients‟ lesions 
(that is seven patients), was located in the paraventricular area and involved 
caudate nucleus (22, -7, 18) and thalamus (23, -15, 20) (for a graphical 
representation, see Figure 3.6a).  
Similarly, the region of maximum overlap, that contained the overlap of at least 
50% of LBD patients‟ lesion (that is, five patients) was located in the left white 
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matter and involved the claustrum (-29, -19, 21) and the lentiform nucleus (-25, -
19, 6) (for a graphical representation, see Figure 3.6b). 
To compare lesions‟ extension we conducted a Mann Whitney U-test on the 
mean number of voxels involved by the lesion for each patient in the RBD 
patients‟ group and LBD patients‟ group. Results confirmed that the two groups 
were not significantly different regarding the „total lesion volume‟ (p>.05). 
 
Figure 3.6 – Overlay lesion plots of the 15 RBD (a) and 11 LBD (b) patients 
superimposed onto MNI template. The region frequency of brain lesions in each area is expressed 
according to the color scale ranging from violet (lesion present in one patient) to red (lesion present in all 
patients). 
 
3.4.2. Voxel-based lesion-symptom mapping analysis  
Following mapping of individual lesions we performed a VLSM analysis (Bates 
et al., 2003; Verdon et al., 2010) to explore the anatomical regions related to 
selective impairment in implicit and explicit bodily self-processing. An index of 
self-processing (calculated as: self minus other stimuli accuracy) was used as 
predictors for the patients‟ performance, separately for Implicit and Explicit 
tasks. We adopted the Brunner-Munzel test (Brunner & Munzel, 2000) to 
perform statistical comparisons on a voxel-wise basis, as implemented in NPM 
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(Non Parametric Mapping) and MRIcron software. Brunner-Munzel tests were 
performed at each voxel using the performance measure as dependent variable. 
In order to avoid producing inflated Z-scores, tests were run using permutation 
derived correction (permFWE; Kimberg & Schwartz, 2007; Medina et al., 2010). 
Areas showing significant relationship (P was set at 0.05) with behavioral deficit 
were identified. Only voxels affected in at least four cases (15%) were included 
in the analysis. 
In the statistical analysis described below, the anatomical distribution of the 
statistical results was assessed using the Automated Anatomical Labelling map 
(template AAL; Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002), which classifies the anatomical 
distribution of digital images in stereotactic space. The anatomical structures 
revealed by this analysis are associated with lower index of self-processing (self 
accuracy < other accuracy).  
Mapping of implicit self-recognition index revealed two peaks in the right 
hemisphere: the first (Z=3.39, range -1.785 - 3.39) located in the paraventricular 
area involving the caudate nucleus (21, -8, 29) and the second peak (Z=3.26) 
located in the subcortical frontal region involving the internal capsule, the right 
lenticular nucleus (27, -11, 19) and the antero-medial portion of the inferior 
fronto-occipital tract (Catani, et al., 2012a) (see Figure 3.7a and Table 2). 
Finally, mapping of explicit self-recognition index failed to reveal significant 
anatomical clusters, indeed none region survived the permFWE correction 
applied. However, observing Z-scores, highest values were associated with the 
left hemisphere (Z=1.96, range -1.151 – 2.5), specifically with a lesion that 
involved the putamen (-27, -22, 22). Further peaks were located in the right 
hemisphere, more specifically in the inferior parietal lobe (Z=1.78; 62, -35, 
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25; Brodmann area 40) involving angular (Z=1.78; 42, -45, 25) and 
supramarginal gyrus (Z=1.79; 35, -49, 29) (see Figure 3.7b and Table 3.2). In 
addition, lesion crossed the white fiber constituting the superior longitudinal 
arcuate fasciculus (Catani, et al., 2012b).  
 
 Table 3.2 - Brain regions associated with Implicit and Explicit body recognition deficit. 
  
 
   
MNI Coordinate (x, y, z) Z-score Brain Structure Cluster level 
size 
Implicit bodily self-recognition 
 
  
21 -8 29 3.39 R caudate nucleus  282 
27 -11 19 3.26 R lenticular nucleus and internal capsule  53 
Explicit bodily self-recognition 
 
  
-27 -22 22 1.96 L putamen  - 
35 -49 29 1.79 R supramarginal gyrus  - 
42 -45 25 1.78 R angular   - 
62 -35 25 1.78 R inferior parietal lobe, BA 40  - 
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Figure 3.7 – Representative slices from map showing the anatomical correlates of 
self-implicit (a) and self-explicit index (b) in the entire sample of patients.  
Maps show the Z-statistics calculated with Brunner-Munzel with permutation derived corrected. All peaks 
are significant at P < 0.05 level (upper panel).  
 
3.5 Implicit and explicit dissociations 
Lesion analysis above described revealed that impaired performance in implicit 
bodily self-recognition is selectively associated with a lesion of the right 
hemisphere. By contrast, even if anatomical data are not significant, impaired 
performance in explicit bodily self-recognition seems to be related to both left 
and right brain regions.  
To elucidate the anatomical correlate of a selective deficit, the presence of 
possible dissociation in implicit and explicit self bodily knowledge was 
investigated in each patient. Since in the group analysis possible dissociations 
may have gone unobserved because of the well-known averaging artefact 
(Shallice, 1988), we therefore compared the performance of each patient with the 
performance of the control group for self body-parts, separately in the Implicit 
and in the Explicit task, by using a modified t-test which takes into account the 
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size of the control group (Crawford & Garthwaite, 2002). This comparison 
revealed that 35% of RBD patients (7/20) were selectively impaired in the 
implicit or in the explicit self-body processing compared to controls. Crucially, 
the majority of them (71% = 5/7) were selectively impaired in the implicit but 
not in the explicit self-body processing, whereas other patients (29% = 2/7) were 
selectively impaired in the explicit but not in implicit self-body processing. 
Finally, one LBD patient (8% = 1/13) was selectively impaired in the explicit but 
not in implicit self-body processing.  
In order to verify whether patients‟ lesions involved the region found in VLSM 
analysis associated with implicit and explicit self-body recognition, individual 
plots are shown. Lesion data of only three out of five RBD patients selectively 
impaired in the implicit self-recognition (see Figure 3.8a) and of two patients (1 
RBD and 1 LBD) selectively impaired in the explicit self-recognition were 
available (see Figure 3.8b). 
Two RBD patients (RBD 3 and RBD 4) were affected by lesions encompassing 
right frontal regions, similar to the region emerged with VLSM. The lesion of 
the third RBD patient (RBD 14) was more posterior, involving the parietal and 
temporal lobes. Finally, patients showing a selective impairment in explicit 
bodily self-processing were affected by lesions corresponding to the inferior 
temporal lobe in the right hemisphere (RBD 16) and the putamen in the left 
hemisphere (LBD 3). 
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Figure 3.8 – Brain lesion associated with implicit and explicit self-recognition 
deficits. 
Brain lesion plots of three RBD patients selectively impaired in implicit self body-parts recognition (a) and 
two patients (1 LBD and 1 RBD) selectively impaired in explicit self body-parts recognition (b), 
superimposed onto MNI template; individual lesions are marked in red.  
 
3.6 Discussion 
The main focus of the current study was to explore whether implicit and explicit 
recognition of self body-parts could be selectively impaired after brain lesions. 
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To this aim, thirty-three patients (20 RBD and 13 LBD) and twenty age-matched 
neurologically healthy subjects were submitted to two different tasks designed 
for testing implicit and explicit body-parts recognition. 
In the Implicit task (Experiment 1), healthy subjects showed a better 
performance when the displayed hand was their own hand compared to other 
people‟s hand, showing the so called  self-advantage effect. Crucially, this self-
advantage was found only for the right hand but not for the left displayed hand. 
In contrast, such self-advantage effect could no longer be observed in the 
Explicit task  (Experiment 2). When participants were required to judge if the 
displayed hand was their own hand, they were slower and less accurate with their 
own hand compared to others‟ hand.  
Another critical difference between the Implicit and the Explicit task 
performance in healthy subjects is that different strategies were used to perform 
the two tasks. Mental motor rotation of body-parts is required to solve the 
laterality judgment task in the Implicit task (Experiment 1) (Ionta et al., 2007; 
Parsons, 1987, 1994; Parsons & Fox, 1998) while it is not necessary to solve the 
Explicit task (Experiment 2). The difference in task requirements is reflected in 
the classical bell-shaped function observed for response times only in 
Experiment 1 but not in Experiment 2 (see Figures 3.4 and 3.5). The 
involvement of laterality judgment in the Implicit task requires motor 
representation (see also Ferri et al., 2011). Since the very same Implicit task also 
showed self-advantage effect, one would assume the latter to be closely related 
to the involvement of motor (rather than merely cognitive as in the Explicit task) 
function in healthy subjects.   
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According to this hypothesis, the presence, in healthy subjects, of a self-
advantage only for self-right hand stimuli is likely the consequence of the greater 
involvement of the left, rather than the right, sensorimotor areas in right-handers 
during a mental motor task (see Conson et al., 2010; Ferri et al., 2011; Gentilucci 
et al., 1998). An alternative interpretation of these results, that the advantage for 
the right displayed hand was due to a generic hand-response bias, was ruled out 
because the self-advantage effect for the right hand emerged independently from 
the responding hand.  
In the Explicit task, completely different results emerged in healthy subjects in 
which a disadvantage for self-related stimuli was found. Taken together, data of 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 suggest that there are two ways to access to 
bodily self-knowledge: one way leading to an implicit, but not to an explicit 
knowledge, and the other way leading to an explicit knowledge. In this respect 
the neuropsychological approach can be useful to verify the existence of these 
different ways. Indeed, if this is true, only one of the two ways can be impaired 
after a focal brain lesion. Previous studies on RBD and LBD patients have 
already shown a crucial role of the right hemisphere for  the implicit self-
advantage effect (Frassinetti et al., 2008, 2009, 2010). The mental rotation task 
of right and left hand, in RBD and LBD patients, can shed new light on the 
contribution of patients‟ motor abilities to the relationship between the implicit 
self-recognition and the right hemisphere. Moreover, in the present study, in the 
same sample of LBD and RBD patients, in addition to the implicit, also the 
explicit self- recognition was, for the first time, investigated.  
Patients‟ with right, but not left, brain lesions showed significant impairment in 
implicit self-body recognition, in which no self-advantage effect was found. 
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VLSM analysis (Bates et al., 2003; Verdon et al., 2010) revealed selective 
impairments especially in the subcortical regions such as the caudate nucleus, 
the internal capsule and the lenticular nucleus in the right hemisphere. Thus, 
our data suggest a right hemisphere specialization for implicit self-body 
recognition. This is not only in line with previous studies (Frassinetti et al., 2008, 
2009, 2010) but also strengthened by the fact that 25% of RBD patients and no 
one of LBD patients were selectively impaired in implicit self-body recognition.  
As far as the left brain damaged patients, they showed the self-advantage effect. 
However, this effect was not selective for the right hand, as in controls, but it 
was present for both hands. This can be explained by the motor impairment of 
the right contralesional hand that might have reduced the lateralization of this 
facilitation.  
Taken together these findings suggest that what we observe in this study is the 
concurrence of two distinct effects. First of all, the mental rotation of a body-part 
induced by the laterality judgment task when rotated hands are displayed, and, 
second, the sense of body ownership that emerges when the rotated hand is ones‟ 
own hand. The laterality judgment task recruits motor areas that, in right handed 
subjects, are more strongly represented in the left than in the right hemisphere 
(Ferri et al., 2012), whereas the body ownership per se is more represented in the 
right hemisphere. 
Such dissociation, between task requirements and sense or experience of 
mineness of the own body, is supported by previous studies of ours (Frassinetti 
et al., 2008, 2009, 2010). Using a visual matching task with body-parts as 
stimuli, in which the mental rotation is less strengthened, the self-advantage 
emerged both for left and right limbs. Moreover, neuroimaging data support the 
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specific right hemispheric involvement in constructing the sense of body 
ownership (for reviews see: Decety & Sommerville, 2003; Feinberg & Keenan, 
2005). Our data support the evidence found on healthy subjects by showing, for 
the first time, that right hemispheric lesion, do indeed lead to impairment in the 
sense of body ownership. 
Furthermore, the regions impaired mainly involved right basal ganglia (caudate 
nucleus, lenticular nucleus and internal capsule) that are implicated in motor 
function. Coherently, several neuroimaging studies showed that the ability to 
physically distinguish self from non-self stimuli, such as one‟s own body from 
another‟s body and one‟s own action from another‟s action, primarily involved 
somatosensory and motor cortices (Devue et al., 2007; Ferri et al., 2012; Sugiura 
et al., 2006; Uddin et al., 2005). Further evidence derives from a recent study 
that applied single-pulse TMS to the right motor cortex and observed an increase 
in cortical excitability for self-specific stimuli when compared to non-self-
specific stimuli (Salerno et al., 2012). Thus, based on both behavioral and 
anatomical data, an integrated cortical–subcortical motor network in the right 
hemisphere underlies implicit knowledge of bodily self. 
As far as for the Explicit task, both right and left brain damaged patients better 
recognized others‟ than self body-parts (self-disadvantage effect) suggesting that 
the network for the explicit recognition of one‟s own body recruits areas of both 
hemispheres. These behavioral data are partially supported by anatomical data. 
Indeed, VLSM analysis suggests that the putamen in the left hemisphere and the 
inferior parietal lobule in the right hemisphere are crucial for explicit bodily self 
processing. Even if these data should be taken with caution, because this analysis 
failed to reveal significant clusters, the comparison of each patient‟s 
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performance with controls supports a contribution of both hemispheres in 
explicit self-body knowledge. Indeed, 10% of RBD patients as well as 8% of 
LBD patients were selectively impaired in explicit self-body recognition.  
These findings are in agreement with the dissociation between implicit and 
explicit forms of awareness in disorders concerning bodily recognition and sense 
of body ownership, such as somatoparaphrenia and anosognosia (Moro et al., 
2008; for a review see Vallar & Ronchi, 2006, 2009). Patients with 
somatoparaphrenia and anosognosia do not show an explicit knowledge but can 
have spared implicit awareness of their body and of its motor potentialities. 
However, to our knowledge, this is the first time that the opposite dissociation 
(an impaired implicit and a spared explicit knowledge) is described.  
Very recently Moro et al. (2011) investigated the neural correlates of implicit 
and emergent motor awareness in patients with anosognosia for hemiplegia. 
Analogously with our results here, they observed that deficits in implicit and 
explicit awareness are associated with lesions involving different cortico-
subcortical structures, the former being more anterior and the latter ones being 
more posterior (see also Moro, 2013).  
 
3.6.1. Conclusions 
In sum, the present findings lead to consider that different brain lesions may 
cause specific deficits in bodily self-processing. Indeed, while a network of right 
subcortical motor regions (including basal ganglia) underpins the implicit 
recognition of self body-parts, right posterior, but also left regions, may be 
involved in the explicit recognition of self body-parts. The existence of two of 
distinct networks (implicit and explicit) for self-body recognition could be 
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particularly relevant for the diagnosis and rehabilitation of these disorders. Thus, 
the evaluation of implicit and explicit impairment in self-body processing should 
be included in the post-lesion neuropsychological assessment performed in the 
rehabilitative clinical practice. Furthermore, specific attention to the bodily self-
processing should be carried out especially during the early phases following 
brain damage. Indeed, in these stages, plastic phenomena concerning both the 
brain and self-processing reorganization can occur. Thus, appropriate therapeutic 
strategies integrating sensorimotor, emotional and cognitive components may be 
introduced to support structure and functions of bodily reorganization of the self, 
including implicit aspects of the subjective experience. In sum, this could allow 
to improve the neuroscientific knowledge on bodily self, a crucial component of 
self-processing (Northoff et al., 2006; Northoff & Panksepp, 2008).    
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Chapter 4 
 
How the pathological embodiment affects the 
bodily self-recognition: evidence from 
neuropsychological patients 
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4.1 Introduction 
In the last two decades, a growing literature in neuroscience has been focused on 
the mechanisms which contribute to properly develop a coherent sense of body 
ownership (for review see de Vignemont, 2011; Blanke et al., 2015). Briefly, we 
constantly receive several information arising from our limbs, that‟s mainly 
visual, motor, somatosensory and proprioceptive, but we can also perceive our 
body from the inside, that‟s the interoceptive component. However, how can all 
these signals actually make our body as be perceived so clearly and inevitably as 
mine body, is matter of debate. In this respect, the boundary between our 
corporeal self and what we recognized as other people‟s body is crucially, since 
it allow us to reliably distinguish between what is and what is not mine.  
Thus, here the notion of embodiment is critical. Accordingly with de Vignemont 
(2011), embodiment is referred to a specific processing in which an object or a 
body-part became part of one‟s own body. Along this view, embodiment is a 
necessary condition for the feeling of bodily ownership to occur.  
Starting from neuroscientific and neuropsychological evidence, we described 
how we can illusory perceive an artificial body-part as one‟s own and how, this 
feeling may be lost following brain damage. Behavioral and neuroimaging 
studies on healthy subjects investigated the mechanisms underpinning the 
illusory feeling of an artificial body-part as one‟s own. For instance, by means of 
the rubber hand (RHI; Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris et al., 2007) or the 
enfacement illusion (Sforza et al., 2010; Tsakiris, 2008), and more recently 
adopting the full-body illusion, participants identify themselves with a seen 
virtual body (Ehrsson, 2007; Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Petkova & Ehrsson, 
2008). Basically, in the RHI when the experimenter simultaneously strokes both 
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the participant hand and the rubber hand, participants report feeling as if the 
rubber hand was part of their body. The strength of this feeling was found to 
correlate with a larger network of cortical areas, including premotor, posterior 
parietal, insula, and cerebellum (Ehrsson et al., 2004; Ehrsson, 2007). Taken 
together, these studies successfully highlighted how multisensory bodily signals, 
mainly proprioceptive and visual information, need to be integrated in order to 
perceive a body or a body-part as one‟s own (for review see Blanke et al., 2015).  
Critically, to elucidate the grounds of the sense of body-ownership further 
interesting efforts raised from clinical studies conducted on neurological and 
neuropsychological patients.  
One first example is provided by somatoparaphrenic patients, who often are 
affected by anosognosia for their left hemiplegia, and report delusional beliefs 
concerning the left side of their body. Indeed, these patients claimed that their 
paralyzed limb belongs to someone else, showing a clear disownership of their 
body-parts (for a review see Vallar & Ronchi, 2009).  
More recently, also the opposite behavior has been described in brain damaged 
patients. Indeed, Garbarini and coworkers (Garbarini et al., 2013; 2014; 
Garbarini & Pia, 2013; Pia et al., 2013) reported hemiplegic and/or 
hemianesthesic patients who misidentify other people‟s hand as their own. To 
refer to this clinical manifestation the authors coined the term of pathological 
embodiment. Such a delusion of ownership spontaneously occurred whenever the 
examiner‟s left hand (alien hand) was positioned between the controlesional 
(left) and the right patient hand, according to the patient‟s egocentric 
coordinates. Interestingly, during the neuropsychological evaluation patients 
with pathological embodiment (E+) do not explicitly denying that their 
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controlesional limb belonged to themselves (as in somatoparaphrenic delusion), 
however they incorporated other people‟s hand into their bodily representation.  
In this respect, several further investigations revealed that these patients are 
affected by a profound alteration of their corporeal representation. For instance, 
the role of motor information was tested during a bimanual coupling task in 
which left-hemiplegic patients were asked to draw lines with their intact hand 
and to try to draw circles with their left hand. Crucially, in E+ patients a 
coupling effect, that‟s the ovalization of the drawn lines, was found only when 
the alien hand drawing circles was presented and aligned with the patient‟s 
coordinates, demonstrating that the alien arm was incorporated in the patient‟s 
motor representation (Garbarini et al., 2013). Moreover, having observed an 
alien arm performing a tool-use training, E+ patients overestimated the length of 
their arm, similarly to what was found in healthy subjects during active tool-use 
training (Garbarini et al., 2015). This evidence suggested that both intentional 
motor processes and the spatial extension of the own body representation can be 
modulated by an altered sense of body-ownership. 
Overall, the mentioned studies demonstrated that the bodily self-representation 
does not necessarily match the physical body, opening up a window to the 
understanding of the sense of body-ownership (Brugger & Lenggenhager, 2014).  
At this point, an interesting question arises spontaneously: should patients with 
an altered sense of body ownership, as well as E+ patients, be impaired also in 
self-body recognition processing? Indeed, recognition of one‟s self-body arise 
through the integration of multi-modality processes: somatosensory, 
proprioceptive and motor information, as well as sense of agency and body-
awareness.  
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In order to address whether and how an altered sense of bodily ownership may 
abolish our ability to distinguish between self and other people‟ body-parts, we 
adopted two experimental tasks specifically developed to investigate the bodily 
self-representation, using implicit and explicit judgments. Indeed, it was recently 
demonstrated that humans have an implicit knowledge of their body. In this 
respect, Frassinetti and coworkers (2008, 2009, 2010) investigated the implicit 
recognition of self body-parts, by using a visual matching-to-sample task. 
Participants were required to decide which of two vertically aligned images 
(high or low) matched the central target stimulus. Stimuli could depict 
participants‟ or other people‟ body-parts. Results showed that participants‟ 
performance was more accurate with self rather than other‟ body-parts. This 
facilitation was called self-advantage effect. Intriguing, the self-advantage effect 
was not found when participants were explicitly required to judge whether the 
upper or the lower stimulus corresponded to their own body-parts (Frassinetti et 
al., 2011). 
An important contribution to understand the neural basis of the implicit 
recognition of bodily self, came from neuropsychological studies conducted on 
patients with focal brain lesion. Previous studies (Frassinetti et al., 2008, 2009, 
2010) reported a deficit in right but not in left brain damaged patients when an 
implicit self body recognition was required. These findings suggest that the right 
hemisphere may be involved in the implicit recognition of self body-parts.  
Based on this evidence, we expected an impairment both in E+ and in E- patients 
when the implicit self-body recognition was investigated, similarly to RBD 
patients. In addition, since E+ but not E- patients misidentify others body-part as 
their left limb, we expected that the observed deficit also affects the recognition 
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of other people‟ body-parts. Alternatively, in line with the pathological 
embodiment specifically show for the alien hand, E+ patients may show an 
advantage for other people‟s hand processing. 
As far as the explicit self-body recognition, it has never been investigated in 
brain damaged patients. Accordingly with the pathological embodiment reported 
during the evaluation, we hypothesized that E+ but not E- patients more 
frequently misidentify as their own stimuli depicting other people‟s hand. 
Conversely, E- patients may show a selective impairment in recognize their 
body-parts.  
4.2 Materials and methods 
4.2.1 Participants and neuropsychological assessment 
Twelve healthy participants (4 males, mean age ± sd = 65.9 ± 7.8 years; mean 
education ± sd = 9.25 ± 5.1 years; hereinafter Control group), twelve RBD 
patients without pathological embodiment (5 males, mean age ± sd = 66.7 ± 7.5 
years; mean education ± sd = 9.75 ± 4 years; hereinafter E- group) and twelve 
RBD patients with pathological embodiment (6 males, mean age ± sd = 67.1 ± 
11.3 years; mean education ± sd = 6.75 ± 3.1 years; hereinafter E+ group) were 
recruited to participated in the study. Two One-way ANOVAs confirmed that the 
three groups were not significantly different for age [F(2, 33) = 0.04; p = .95; η2p 
=.01] and education [F(2, 33) = 195; p =.16; η2p =.11].  
All participants were right handed by their own verbal report.  
To assess the presence of a general cognitive impairment the Mini-Mental State 
Examination (Folstein et al., 1975) was used. The presence and severity of 
extrapersonal neglect (Bit Conventional scale; Halligan et al., 1991), personal 
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neglect (Fluff Test; Cocchini et al., 2001) and anosognosia for hemiplegia and 
hemianestesia (Spinazzola et al., 2008) were also assessed (for details see Table 
4.1).  
Patients were recruited at the Fondazione Maugeri Hospital (Castel Goffredo, 
Italy), at the Don Gnocchi Hospital and at the San Camillo Hospital (TO). 
All participants, naive to the purpose of the study, gave their informed consent to 
participate to the study. The study was approved by the local ethics committee 
(Department of Psychology of Bologna), and all procedures were in agreement 
with the Helsinki Declaration (2008). 
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Table 4.1: Clinical and neuropsychological data of right brain damaged 
patients according to the pathological embodiment.  
 
Patient 
HP AHP HA AHA Proprioception MMSE 
Personal 
NSU 
BIT  
E- 1 1 0 0 0  + 24  - 136 
E- 2 3 0 3 0  - 24  - 141 
E- 3 3 0 1 /  + 29  - 144 
E- 4 3 0 3 0  - 28  - / 
E- 5 3 0 0 0  + 25,5  - 112 
E- 6 3 0 3 0  - 26  - 141 
E- 7 1 0 0 0  + 30  - 134 
E- 8 1 0 0 0  + 28,4  - 142 
E- 9 3 0 3 0  + /  - 142 
E- 10 1 0 0 0  + 25  - / 
E- 11 0 / 0 /  + 28  - / 
E- 12 3 0 0 / / 26  - 142 
E+ 1 3 0 3 0  - 25  + 51 
E+ 2 3 0 3 0  - 25  - 83 
E+ 3 3 0 3 0  + 24  + 85 
E+ 4 3 0 3 1  - 24  + 30 
E+ 5 0 0 1 2  - 24 / 64 
E+ 6 3 0 3 2  - 26,2  - 86 
E+ 7 3 0 3 2  - 24,4  - 66 
E+ 8 3 0 3 2  - 27,2  + 111 
E+ 9 2 0 0 0  + 24  - 68 
E+ 10 0 0 3 0  - 24  + 100 
E+ 11 3 0 3 0  - 24 / 57 
E+ 12 3 0 3 1  + 24,3 / 122 
 
E- = patients without pathological embodiment; E+ = patients with pathological 
embodiment; HP = motor deficit; AHP = anosognosia for hemiplegia; HA = sensory 
deficit; AHA = anosognosia for hemianestesia (evaluated according with the following 
criteria: low = 1; mild = 2; severe = 3); Proprioception = indicated as present (+) or 
absent (-); MMSE = Mini Mental State Examination (scores are corrected for years of 
education and age; cut off > 24); Personal NSU = indicated as present (+) or absent (-) 
according with the score obtained at the Fluff Test (cut off < 2 omissions); BIT scale = 
score obtained at the Conventional Subscale (cut off > 129). 
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Embodiment evaluation 
In order to evaluate the presence/absence of the pathological embodiment, all 
patients were tested with an ad hoc protocol described in a previous study before 
the experimental tasks (Garbarini et al., 2013).  
Patients sat on a chair with both hands lying on the table. An alien (the 
examiner‟s) left hand was positioned on the table, aligned with the patient‟s left 
shoulder, in a congruent position with respect to the patient‟s trunk midline, 
between the patient‟s body and the patient‟s left hand. Three objects of different 
colors were placed on the table, the yellow one in front of the patient‟s left hand, 
the green one in front of the examiner‟s hand. Patients were asked to complete 
movements in order to reach their left hand with their right hand and identify 
their left hand on the basis of the colored objects. Patients who reach the alien 
hand in both requested movements will be included in E+ group (see Figure 4.1). 
 
Figure 4.1 – Embodiment evaluation.  
The experimenter ask the patient to identify his left hand on the basis of the colored objects and to reach his 
left hand with his right hand. The alien hand, belonging to the confederate, was placed between the patient‟ 
hands.   
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4.2.2 Stimuli and procedure 
Stimuli were grey-scale pictures of the dorsal view of right and left hands. 
Participants‟ hands were photographed in a session prior to the experiments, 
according to the experimental procedure described by Frassinetti and colleagues 
(2011). Half of the trials (n = 32) depicted the participant‟s own left or right hand 
(„self‟ trials), whereas the other half depicted the right or left hand of other three 
people (n = 32; „other‟ trials). As far as the latter one, three stimuli were selected 
from a database of hands pictures as the best match with each participant‟s hand 
for size, age, skin color and gender. All stimuli were presented in egocentric and 
allocentric perspective.  
Participants sat in front of a PC screen, at a distance of about 50 cm. A central 
fixation cross (1000 ms duration) was presented at the beginning of each trial 
followed by a display containing the hands‟ pictures on a white background. 
Stimuli presentation was controlled by E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools 
Inc.) and each trial was timed-out by the participant‟s vocal response.  In 
Experiment 1, three stimuli were simultaneously presented in each trial, 
vertically aligned on the computer screen, until the participant responded. The 
central stimulus was presented in a black frame, and corresponded to the target 
stimulus. Stimuli presented in each trial were matched for visual similarity.  
In Experiment 1, participants had to judge whether the upper or the lower hand 
corresponded to the central target. In Experiment 2, participants had to explicitly 
judge whether the displayed hand corresponded or not to their own hand (see 
Figure 4.2). Participants were instructed to verbally respond as accurately as 
possible by means of a microphone positioned in front of the patient‟s chest used 
to record participants‟ vocal responses. Then, the experimenter manually 
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recorded the participant‟ response by pressing one of the three assigned keys on 
the keyboard. 
An adapted version of both experiments to patients showing signs of neglect or 
left hemianopia was designed by shifting all stimuli to the right side of the 
screen.  
Thus, each experiment comprised 64 trials, 16 trials for each of the four 
conditions: self-right hand, self-left hand, other-right hand, other-left hand. Half 
of the trials depicted stimuli presented in egocentric perspective, whereas the 
other half depicted stimuli in allocentric perspective. Since Experiment 1 
investigated the implicit and Experiment 2 the explicit bodily self-recognition, 
Experiment 1 was always conducted before Experiment 2. All participants 
performed both experiments in one single session lasting up to one hour. 
 
Figure 4.2 - An example of a single trial for the Implicit task (on the left) and the 
Explicit task (on the right). 
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4.2.3 Statistical analyses  
Data from Experiment 1 (Implicit task) and Experiment 2 (Explicit task) were 
analyzed separately. We compared Self and Other conditions according with the 
definition adopted in a previous study (Frassinetti et al., 2008), that is trials in 
which at least one picture belonged to the participant (Self condition).and trials 
in which no stimulus belonged to the participant (Other condition). 
In order to compare Controls‟ and patients‟ performance, a repeated measure 
ANOVA on accuracy (percentage of correct responses) with Owner (self and 
other), Laterality (left and right) and Perspective (allocentric and egocentric) as 
within-subjects factors and Group (Controls, E+ and E- patients) as between-
subjects factor was conducted.  
Post-hoc analyses were conducted by using Newman Keuls. The magnitude of 
effect size was expressed by partial eta square (η2p). 
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Experiment 1  
The variable Group was significant [F(2,33)=13.51, p<.0001; η2p=.45]: which 
was mainly due to lower accuracy for E+ patients (66%), compared to both E- 
patients (88%, p<.001) and Controls (88%, p<.001). Conversely, E- patients and 
Controls were not significantly different (p=.97). 
Crucially, this main effect was qualified by a three-way interaction Laterality x 
Owner x Group [F(2,33)=7.70, p<.002; η2p=.32]. As far as the right hand, a 
self-advantage effect emerged in healthy participants: they were more accurate 
with self (93%) compared to other people right hand (81%; p<.05). Conversely, 
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a lack of this effect was found both in E- patients (self right=87% vs. other 
right=83%; p=.28) and E+ patients (self right=61% vs. other right=70%; p=.09). 
As far as the left hand, no difference was found comparing self and other stimuli 
in all groups (Controls: self left=89% vs. other left=91%; p=.75; E- patients: self 
left=93% vs. other left=89%; p=.66; E+ patients: self left=69% vs. other 
left=64%; p=.13).  
Looking into differences across the three groups, post-hoc comparisons showed 
that E+ patients (64%) performed worse with the other left-hand, that is the 
condition in which they showed the embodiment phenomenon, compared to E- 
patients (89%; p<.03) and Controls (91%; p<.02). Furthermore, E+ patients 
(61%) performed worse with the one‟s own right-hand compared to E- patients 
(87%; p<.02) and Controls (93%; p<.001). Conversely, when E- patients were 
compared to Controls no such differences were observed (all ps >.78). 
Critically, when the one‟s own left-hand was considered no difference was 
observed across the three groups (Controls=89%; E- patients=93%; E+ 
patients=69%; all ps>.08) as well as considering the other right-hand 
(Controls=81%; E- patients=83%; E+ patients=70%; all ps>.12; see Figure 4.3). 
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Figure 4.3 - Accuracy for Controls, E+ and E- patients in the Implicit task  
The mean of correct response in the Implicit task as a function of Ownership (Self, Other) and Laterality 
(left and right hand) respectively for Controls, E+ and E- patients. Error bars depict SEMs. Differences 
significant at p<.05 are starred.  
 
4.3.2 Experiment 2  
The variable Group was significant [F(2,33) = 9.13, p < .0001; η2p =.36]: both 
E+ (32%) and E- patients (43%) performed worse compared to Controls (58%, 
all ps<.03). Conversely, none difference was found comparing E+ and E- 
patients (p=.06).  
The interaction Owner x Group [F(2,33) = 5.04, p < .01; η2p =.23] was 
significant. First of all, with Self’ stimuli, E- patients (27%) performed 
significantly worse than Controls (54%, p<.02). Conversely, comparing E+ 
patients and Controls (38% vs. 54%, p=.12) no difference was found. A 
completely different pattern of result emerged when Other’ stimuli were 
considered: indeed E+ patients (24%) performed significantly worse than 
Controls (62%, p<.003) and E- patients (60%; p<.004). Conversely, no 
difference emerged between E- patients and Controls (p=.85; see Figure 4.4).  
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Furthermore, the three-way interaction Owner x Perspective x Group 
[F(2,33)=3.66, p<.04; η2p=.18] was significant. In order to look more deeply at 
the above described effect and taking into account the factor Perspective, post-
hoc comparisons were conducted. The impaired performance observed for Self’s 
stimuli in the E- group (29%) was selective for the egocentric condition 
(Controls=62%; p<.01). Indeed, no difference was found between E- and 
Controls when the allocentric condition was considered (E- patients=25% vs. 
Controls=45%; p=.27). As far as E+ patients, the impairment with Others’ 
stimuli was found both in the egocentric (E+ patients=22% vs. Controls=56%; 
and E- patients=62%; p<.01) and allocentric conditions (E+ patients=27% vs. 
Controls = 68%; p < .003).  
Finally, a self-disadvantage effect emerged both in Controls (self=45%; 
other=68%; all ps<.003) and E- patients (self=25%; other=58%; all ps<.001) 
with allocentric stimuli. A completely different effect was found in E+ patients 
who showed an other-disadvantage effect with egocentric stimuli (self=39%; 
other=25%; all ps<.05). 
 
Figure 4.4 - Accuracy in the Explicit task.  
The mean of correct response in the Explicit task as a function of Ownership (Self, Other) respectively for 
Controls, E+ and E- patients. Error bars depict SEMs. Differences significant at p<.05 are starred.  
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4.4 Lesion study 
Brain lesions were identified by Computed Tomography and Magnetic 
Resonance digitalized images (CT/RMI) of 8 E+ patients and 7 E- patients. For 
each patient, the location and extent of brain damage was delineated and 
manually mapped in the stereotactic space of the MNI by using the free software 
MRIcro (Rorden & Brett, 2000).  
As first step, MNI template was rotated (pitch only) to approximate the slice 
plane of the patient‟s scan. A trained rater (MC), using anatomically landmarks, 
manually mapped the lesion onto each correspondent template slice. After that, 
drawn lesions were inspected by a second trained rater (FF) and in case of 
disagreement, an intersection lesion map was used. Finally, lesions maps were 
rotated back into the standard space applying the inverse of the transformation 
parameters used on the stage of adaptation to the brain scan. 
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Lesion overlap  
To localize and to measure the lesion extension of the two patients‟ groups, the 
lesion of E+ and E- patients were separately overlaid on the ch2 template 
provided by MRIcro and the region of maximum overlap was extracted.  
The region, that contained the overlap of at least 50% of E+ patients‟ lesions 
(green color) was mainly located in the periventricular frontal area, basal 
ganglia, internal capsule and extending to the temporal and parietal regions (for a 
graphical representation, see Figure 4.5a).  
Similarly, the region of maximum overlap, that contained the overlap of at least 
50% of E- patients‟ lesion (green color) was located in the right periventricular 
white matter and involved the putamen and pallidum (see Figure 4.5b). 
Additionally, in order to highlight the brain lesion more frequently associated 
with the pathological embodiment, we subtracted the E+ lesion plot from the E- 
lesion plot. This approach can identify the neural correlates of a given behavior 
by comparing the overlay lesion plot of patients with, and patients without, the 
deficit of interest. This method showed that somatosensory parietal, inferior 
frontal and temporal regions, such as the superior temporal gyrus, are more 
frequently (> 50%) impaired in E+ compared to E- patients (see Figure 4.5c). 
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Figure 4.5 - Overlays of lesion plots of the E+ and E- patients.  
Overlays of lesion plots of the E+ (A) and E- (B) groups. The frequency is represented trough a color scale 
ranging from violet (lesion in one patient) to red (lesion in all patients). Subtraction of regional lesion plots 
(C). Regions damaged more frequently in the E+ group respect to E- group are displayed in warm colors, 
from dark red to yellow.  
4.5 Discussion 
We commonly take for granted that “our body may be the object that we know 
the best”, as Fréderique de Vignemont said (2011). Nevertheless, several 
neuropsychological evidence clearly demonstrated that, following a brain 
damage, our ability to correctly recognize our body may be destroy, instead. 
Accordingly, recent findings demonstrated that right brain damaged patients may 
lost the ability to implicitly recognize their body-parts (Frassinetti et al., 2008, 
2009, 2010). Furthermore, patients affected by pathological embodiment showed 
a clear misidentification of other people‟s limbs as their own, revealing an 
altered sense of body-ownership (Garbarini et al., 2013, 2014). Overall, these 
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evidence clearly suggested that the representation in which the bodily self is 
grounded, may be altered following a brain injury.  
In the present work we sought implicit and explicit bodily recognition processing 
in neuropsychological patients affected by pathological embodiment. Thus, a 
group of RBD patients with (E+) and without (E-) pathological embodiment 
were compared to a group of neurologically healthy participants by using two 
different experiments designed for investigating implicit and explicit self-body 
recognition, respectively.  
Different patterns of results were found in the two experimental tasks. In 
Experiment 1, when an explicit recognition of one‟s own hand was not required 
(Implicit Task), we observe a difference across the three groups. Controls were 
more accurate with self‟ compared to other‟s stimuli, showing the so-called self-
advantage effect. This effect was selectively found for the right-hand, indeed no 
significant difference emerged comparing the self‟ and other‟s left-hand. The 
presence of such a facilitation when judging one‟s own right compared to others‟ 
hands is in line with previous results reported by Ferri and coworkers on young 
healthy participants (2011). Having found the “self-advantage” only for the right 
hand is a further argument in favor of the hypothesis that the self-advantage 
relies upon a sensory-motor representation (Ferri et al., 2012; Frassinetti et al., 
2011). By contrast, a lack of this facilitation emerged both in E+ and E- groups, 
in which no significant difference were observed when self‟ and other‟s stimuli 
were compared, regardless of the hand laterality. This result replicate a previous 
neuropsychological finding and further confirmed that right brain damaged 
patients lost the ability to implicitly recognize their body-parts (Frassinetti et al., 
2008, 2009, 2010).  
97 
 
Additionally, E+ patients showed a selective impairment in the implicit 
processing of the other‟s left hand. Interestingly, this impairment resembles the 
deficit observed during the embodiment evaluation. Indeed, E+ patients 
misattribute the other‟s left hand to themselves demonstrating that they failed to 
recognize the left hand as their own, while they did not show such an impairment 
with the right hand. The presence of such an impairment in the implicit 
processing of other‟s left hand is likely to suggest that E+ patients actually 
incorporated the other‟s left hand in their body representation up to consider it as 
their left hand, and thus transpose their deficit to a body-parts which actually 
belonged to others. One may argue that the deficit observed with the left hand 
may be simply due to the sensorimotor deficit which affects the left hand. 
However, if this would be the case, and thus left hemiplegia and or 
hemianestesia were sufficient to explain this phenomena, a similar deficit should 
occur also in the E- group, since patients were affected by similar clinical 
condition.  
Moreover, the presence of a similar impairment for the one‟s own right hand 
revealed that the presence of a pathological embodiment deeply affects the 
implicit processing of the one‟s own body-parts, or at least of the body-part the 
patient feels as part of their own body. Accordingly, here the impairment was 
observed both for the one‟s own right and other‟s left hand. 
In Experiment 2 (Explicit Task), when bodily self-recognition was explicitly 
required, difference were found both within and across the three groups.  
First of all, when E+ and E- patients were compared to Controls, two different 
pattern of results emerged. E- patients were selectively impaired with Self 
stimuli, whereas E+ patients showed a selective impairment for Other stimuli. 
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Firstly, these findings suggested that the presence of a right brain lesion impairs 
the ability to explicitly recognize a body-part as their own. Additionally, while 
following a brain lesion patients lost the ability to correctly recognize their body-
part (E- patients) the presence of a pathological embodiment specifically affects 
patients‟ ability to attribute a body-part to others misattributing the other‟s hand 
to themselves (E+ patients). 
Moreover, in Controls and E- patients a self-disadvantage effect was found: they 
performed worst with self‟ compared to other‟s stimuli. Conversely, a lack of 
this effect emerged in E+ patients, who showed an other-disadvantage, indeed 
they performed worst with other‟s rather than self‟s body-parts. This finding may 
be explained by their clinical condition: indeed, since they were impaired in self-
body parts recognition and erroneously attributed the other‟s hand to themselves, 
resulting in a worse performance with Other stimuli. 
From an anatomical point of view, in our study E+ patients were affected by 
lesions involving a wide cortical and subcortical network and extending from 
temporo-parietal to frontal regions. Specifically, the damage to the 
periventricular white matter is compatible with the ones identified for being 
responsible for pathological embodiment provided by Garbarini and coworkers 
(2013). In this respect, authors proposed that a deficit in the construction of a 
coherent corporeal representation is the result of a damage to the white matter 
tract linking subcortical structures with cortical sensory-motor areas.  
Furthermore, the lesion of the right temporo-parietal region may explain the 
impairment in self/other distinction. In this respect, several evidence has been 
reported on the role of the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) in embodiment, 
specifically when an integration of tactile, proprioceptive, and visual information 
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was required. For instance, Leube and colleagues (2003) have shown that the 
TPJ codes multisensory conflict or disintegration between visual and 
proprioceptive information about one's arm position. Moreover, when 
transcranial magnetic stimulation is applied over the right TPJ resulted in a 
reduced ability to discriminate between what may or may not be part of one's 
body, suggesting that the rTPJ is actively involved in maintaining a coherent 
sense of one's body (Tsakiris et al., 2008).  
In conclusion, we demonstrated that in presence of a delusion of ownership, such 
as the pathological embodiment, the alien hand can be so deeply incorporated 
into one‟s own body representation to impaired the ability to recognize the one‟s 
own body both at the implicit and explicit level. This is not surprisingly since 
more recently several evidence demonstrated how the altered sense of body 
resulting in the pathological embodiment may also affects the motor and sensory 
domain. Accordingly, patients showed significant interference effect of the alien 
hand movements on the actual movements of their own intact arm (Garbarini et 
al., 2013). Moreover, they referred to feel pain on the alien hand when painful 
stimuli were delivered on it, showing a coherent physiological reactions as if the 
stimulated hand was their own hand (Pia et al., 2013; Garbarini et al., 2014).  
Concerning the ability to discriminate between self and others, patients with 
pathological embodiment and right brain damaged patients who exhibit an 
impairment in implicit bodily self-recognition, previously described (Frassinetti 
et al., 2008; 2010) represent different impairments on two opposite edges. 
Indeed, the first group shows a tendency to explicitly recognize as their own 
body parts of others, whereas the second group implicitly deny the ownership of 
their own body parts. If we imagine to represent the self/other discrimination 
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along an horizontal line with “self” and “other” as two opposite edges, E+ 
patients‟ body-ownership discrimination is biased toward “self”, whereas RBD 
patients‟ body-ownership discrimination is biased toward “other”.  
To sum up, these findings suggested that the presence of a pathological 
embodiment deeply affects the bodily self-representation and our ability to 
recognize the one‟s own body.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Who is speaking? Implicit and explicit self 
and other voice recognition 
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5.1 Introduction 
A fundamental biological function for human species is to recognize people. To 
support this function, in our daily life we usually use a complex multimodal 
system based on multisensory (e.g. visual, auditory, etc.) recognition channels. 
The voice carry different types of information, for example when we hear a 
voice we are informed about both speaker‟s personal characteristics such as 
gender, age and identity and linguistic information. In this respect, the 
importance of voices as a “channel” to convey the identity of the speaker is clear 
when speaker‟s visual characteristics are not available, for example, when we 
answer the phone or when we listen to someone speaking from an adjacent room. 
In these contexts at least two different cognitive abilities are involved: the 
processing of voice‟s characteristics and the recognition of a familiar voice. The 
first process allows us to distinguish between vocal and non-vocal sounds (e.g. 
words with respect to natural sounds or animal cries), whereas the second 
process allows us to recognize a familiar voice among the others.  
As far as the processing of voice‟s characteristics, fMRI studies have 
demonstrated the existence of “temporal voice areas” (TVAs), located bilaterally 
along the superior temporal gyrus, more involved in processing vocal than non-
vocal sounds (Belin et al., 2000; Belin et al., 2011; Ethofer et al., 2009; Gervais 
et al., 2004; Linden et al., 2011). More recently, Bestelmeyer and colleagues 
(2011) showed that applying rTMS over the right upper bank of the superior 
temporal sulci (STS) compared with a control site stimulation that was the right 
supramarginal gyrus (SMG) impaired the voice/non voice discrimination ability. 
Furthermore, a lack of this effect was found in a control task in which 
participants had to judge the loudness of different sounds. 
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Other studies have demonstrated that different regions of the superior temporal 
sulcus (STS) are recruited in processing different aspects of voice (Andics et al., 
2010; Blank et al., 2011; von Kriegstein et al., 2003; von Kriegstein and Giraud 
2004). In a fMRI study, Von Kriegstein and coworkers (2003) asked participants 
to recognize a target speaker or a verbal content in sentences spoken by familiar 
and unfamiliar speakers. Results demonstrated that posterior regions of the STS 
were more involved in the verbal content task, whereas anterior regions were 
responsive to voice recognition.  
Moreover, studies using different approaches have shown that voice recognition 
is dissociated from other aspects of identity such as, for example, face 
recognition (see Gainotti, 2011, 2013 for reviews). Neuropsychological evidence 
shows that the right fusiform gyrus is prevalently involved in face recognition 
(Gauthier et al., 2000; Kanwisher et al., 1997) whereas the right superior 
temporal gyrus is mainly involved in voice recognition (Belin et al., 2000; Belin, 
2006). 
Moreover, famous voice recognition can be dissociated from unfamiliar voice 
discrimination. Studies on brain damaged patients have shown that patients with 
a right posterior peri-sylvian lesion were impaired in famous voice recognition, 
whereas patients with a bilateral temporal lobe lesion were impaired in 
unfamiliar voice discrimination (Van Lancker et al., 1988, 1989). Accordingly, 
neuroimaging data support the notion that familiar and unfamiliar voices are 
processed in different areas showing that the anterior part of the right superior 
temporal sulcus (STS) is more activated for familiar than for unfamiliar voices 
(von Kriegstein et al., 2003; Belin and Zatorre, 2003; von Kriegstein and Giraud 
2004). In a PET study (Nakamura et al., 2001) using a familiar/unfamiliar 
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decision task with friends‟ voices or unknown persons‟ voices, greater activities 
in the right temporal and left frontal pole, in the entorhinal cortex and in the left 
precuneus were found during the recognition of familiar voices.  
Whereas the majority of studies provides evidence about familiar/unfamiliar 
voices discrimination, few neuroimaging (Allen et al., 2005; Nakamura et al., 
2001; Kaplan et al., 2008; Rosa et al., 2008) and neurophysiological studies 
(Graux et al., 2013) have investigated the recognition of one‟s own voice. These 
studies reported the involvement of different brain areas for self as compared to 
other‟s voice recognition.  
Allen and coworkers (2005), in an fMRI study, found that listening to self-
generated words was associated with more activation in the left inferior frontal 
and right anterior cingulate cortex. By contrast, listening to other people‟s 
generated words was associated with greater engagement of the lateral temporal 
cortex bilaterally. Analogously, a difference in the mismatch negativity (MMN) 
was found in an Event-Related-Potentials (ERP) study (Graux et al., 2013) when 
participants passively heard recordings pronounced by themselves with respect 
to when they were pronounced by unknown people.   
Overall, these previous findings suggest that self, familiar and unfamiliar voices 
are processed as distinct information and are subtended by different cerebral 
areas.  
However, it is worth noting that all the mentioned studies (with the only 
exception of the ERP study by Graux at al., 2013) used a paradigm of explicit 
self-voice recognition. This is particularly relevant since in the domain of self-
recognition there is much evidence suggesting a dissociation between implicit 
and explicit self-processing. In this respect, it was recently demonstrated an 
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intriguing dissociation between implicit and explicit self-body recognition. 
Interestingly, participants who implicitly recognized images representing self 
body-parts in a visual matching task, failed to do so when an explicit recognition 
of self-body images was required. Indeed, when participants had to indicate 
which of two vertically aligned images (high or low) matched a central target 
stimulus, they performed better with self rather than other‟ body-parts. By 
contrast, a lack of this facilitation was observed when participants were required 
to explicitly judge if the upper or the lower image corresponded to their own 
body-effector (Ferri et al., 2011; Frassinetti et al., 2011).  
In line with this evidence, the authors proposed the existence of two-way access 
to our self-body knowledge which involves different mechanisms. Indeed, a 
sensorimotor body-representation is engaged in the implicit, but not in the 
explicit, recognition of one‟s own body-parts (Ferri et al., 2012). Thus, the aim 
of the present study was to verify whether also for the voice there appeared a 
dissociation between implicit and explicit self-voice recognition.  
To this aim, a group of healthy subjects was submitted to an implicit and an 
explicit self-voice recognition task. In both tasks, participants listened to pairs of 
auditory stimuli (words or pseudowords). For both types of stimuli, speaker‟s 
voice could belong to: the participant, a familiar or an unfamiliar person. In the 
Implicit task, participants had to judge whether stimuli were pronounced by the 
same speaker or different speakers, whereas in the Explicit task participants had 
to identify if there was, or not, their own voice.  
In line with previous evidence, we postulate that the implicit recognition of one‟s 
own voice, similarly to implicit self-body recognition, relies upon a sensory 
network, whereas the explicit recognition of one‟s own voice is based on 
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cognitive mechanisms. For this reason, the explicit processing could be more 
fallacious than the implicit one (Tranel and Damasio, 1985, Berti and Rizzolatti, 
1992). Thus, we hypothesize a facilitation for one‟s own voice in the implicit but 
not in the explicit task. This would prove that implicit and explicit self-voice 
processing is subtended by different mechanisms. Alternatively, if implicit and 
explicit self-voice processing is based on the same mechanisms, no difference 
should emerge in the two tasks.  
5.2 Material and methods 
5.2.1 Participants  
Sixty-two right-handed healthy participants (21 males, mean age= 43.2 ± 15.1 
years and 41 females, mean age= 37.6 ± 14.7 years; Mann-Whitney U test 
p=.10) without auditory or neurological pathology participated in the study. All 
participants were Italian speakers and were naive to the purpose of the research. 
Written informed consent was obtained from all participants. 
The study was approved by the local ethics committee and all procedures were in 
agreement with the Helsinki Declaration (2008). 
5.2.2 Stimuli  
In a first session, voices were recorded by the same experimenter in a silent and 
quite room by using a recorder (Panasonic RR-XS420) positioned at a fixed 
distance (60 cm) from participant‟s trunk. Participants‟ voice was recorded while 
they pronounced Italian words and pseudowords presented on a sheet of paper 
(A4 format). They were invited to maintain a flat tone of voice and to pronounce 
items as clearly as possible. If the experimenter judged the recorded items not 
easily discriminable, asked participants to repeat them until they were. Words 
107 
 
were disyllabic and high-frequency stimuli (in Italian: cane, foca, lupo, alce, rana 
e topo; in English: dog, seal, wolf, elk, frog, mouse) belonging to the same 
semantic category (animal). Pseudowords were obtained from the words by 
means of two letters replacement (cona, faco, lusa, leca, tupi e rona). 
Subsequently, each vocal stimulus was digitized at 44100 Hz, 16 bit, stereo 
modality, and elaborated using a dedicated software (WavePad Sound Editor) to 
adjust overall sound pressure and to balance the volume. The mean duration of 
each stimulus was 663.18 ms (SD= 100.36; range= 451-894 ms). Each stimulus 
could represent participant‟s voice (A stimulus), the voice of a familiar other (B 
stimulus) or the voice of an unfamiliar other (C stimulus). Each participant was 
asked to bring someone they encounter on a daily basis, of the same race and 
gender. This person served as the „familiar other‟.   
5.2.3 Procedure 
Each trial started with a central fixation point (250 ms duration), followed by the 
sequential presentation (500 ms ISI) of a pair of vocal stimuli. The trial was 
time-out as soon as the participant responded. Inter-trial timing was fixed at 
1000 msec.  
In each trial the two stimuli could either belong to the same person (same trials) 
or to different people (different trials) (see Figures 5.1a and 5.1b). Moreover, 
stimuli could belong to the participant (A), familiar other (B) or unfamiliar other 
(C). Thus, three combinations of “same” stimuli (AA, BB and CC) and three 
combinations of “different” stimuli (AB, AC and BC) were presented. Voices 
were matched for gender and regional accent. Finally, in half of the “same” and 
“different” trials stimuli could be identical (i.e. cane/cane or cona/cona), in the 
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other half not (i.e. cane/foca or cona/faco). Presentation of each 
word/pseudoword was counterbalanced between “same” and “different” trials 
under the six combinations. In this way, possible spurious effects due to material 
were controlled. Words and pseudowords were presented in two separate blocks. 
In each block, 4 trials for each combination of stimuli according with the voice‟s 
owner (AA-BB-CC-AC-AB-BC) were presented for a total of 24 trials. The 
presentation order and the sequence of the type of stimuli (identical and non-
identical) and owner factors (AA-BB-CC-AC-AB-BC) were randomized 
between trials, whereas the two blocks (words and pseudowords) were balanced 
between participants.   
Participants sat in front of a PC screen at a distance of about 60 cm, and were 
required to press two previously assigned response keys, one for affirmative 
(YES) and one for negative (NO) answers. Response buttons were 
counterbalanced between participants. Stimuli were delivered through earphones 
and were presented binaurally. Stimuli presentation and randomization were 
controlled using E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tool ©1996-2012) running 
on a PC. Key press RTs and response accuracy were recorded. 
In the Implicit task, participants were asked to judge whether the two voices 
were the “same” (half participants) or “different” (half participants). In the 
Explicit task, all participants were required to explicitly judge whether at least 
one of the two voices corresponded to their own voice.  
All participants performed the two recognition tasks in one single session, with 
eight practice trials before the main experiment. To avoid an interference effect 
of the explicit recognition of one‟s own voice on the “same/different” task, the 
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Implicit Task was always conducted before the Explicit task. The whole 
experiment took approximately half an hour.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 - An example of “same” (A) and “different” owner trial (B). 
5.3 Results  
5.3.1 Comparison between Implicit and Explicit task 
First of all, to verify whether there was an advantage in implicit/explicit 
processing of one‟s own voice, we compared self and other conditions according 
with the definition of self and other adopted in previous studies (Frassinetti et al., 
2008; Frassinetti et al., 2010), that is trials in which at least one stimulus 
belonged to the participant (self condition: AA-AB-AC) and trials in which no 
stimulus belonged to the participant (other condition: BB-CC-BC). The accuracy 
(% of correct responses) for self and other conditions were separately computed 
for Implicit and Explicit task. A two (Implicit/Explicit Task) by two (Self/Other 
Condition) repeated measure ANOVA was used to analyze the data. The 
Bonferroni test was used to analyze post-hoc effects. The magnitude of effect 
size was expressed by η2p.  
ANOVA showed no significant difference between the Implicit (85%) and the 
Explicit (82%) Task: [F(1,61)=1.21, p=.27]. There was a significant Self/Other 
110 
 
Condition main effect [F(1,61)=24.5, p<.0001, η2p=.29] with Other more 
accurate than Self condition (88% vs. 80%). This main effect was qualified by a 
significant Self/Other x Implicit/Explicit interaction: [F(1,61)=16.51, p<.0001, 
η2p =.21]. The Bonferroni test showed that Other was more accurate than Self 
condition (90% vs. 75%; p<.0001) in the Explicit Task. By contrast, accuracy 
between Self and Other condition (84% vs. 85%; p=1) didn‟t differ in the 
Implicit Task. Moreover, accuracy was worse with self stimuli in the Explicit 
Task than with self and other‟s stimuli in the Implicit Task (p<.002). Instead, the 
Other condition didn‟t differ in the Implicit and Explicit task (85% vs. 90%; 
p=.39; see Figure 5.2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 - Accuracy in the Implicit and Explicit task.  
The mean of correct response in the Implicit and Explicit task as a function of Ownership (Self, Other). 
Error bars depict SEMs. Differences significant at p<.05 are starred.  
 
5.3.2 Separate analyses for Implicit and Explicit task 
To better understand the influence of different factors, such as Owner 
(same/different), Wordiness (word/pseudoword) and Type of stimulus 
(identical/non-identical), further analyses were conducted on Implicit and 
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Explicit tasks separately. Since for “same owner” (AA-BB-CC) only one source 
of variance (one speaker) was present whereas for “different owner” (AB-AC-
BC) two sources of variance (two speakers) were present, two separate 
ANOVAs were conducted. More specifically, two separate ANOVAs for 
“Same” owner trials (AA=self-self, BB=familiar-other/familiar-other, 
CC=unfamiliar-other/unfamiliar-other) and “Different” owner trials 
(AB=self/familiar-other, AC=self/unfamiliar-other; BC=familiar-
other/unfamiliar-other) were carried out, with Owner, Wordiness and Type of 
stimulus as within subjects variables. Post-hoc analyses were conducted by using 
the Bonferroni test. The magnitude of effect size was expressed by η2p.  
 
5.3.2.1 Implicit Task 
Same owner 
When the “same” owner trials were separately analyzed, the variable Owner was 
not significant (AA=86%; BB=88%, CC=85%, p=.29, see Figure 5.3a) as well as 
the variable Wordiness (words=88%, pseudowords=85%, p=.20). Instead, the 
variable Type of stimulus was significant [F(1,61)=33.16, p<.0001, η2p =.35] 
since participants were more accurate with identical than with non-identical 
stimuli (95% vs. 78%). The interactions between the three variables were not 
significant.  
Different owner 
When the “different” owner trials were separately analyzed, the variable Owner 
was not significant (AB=84%; AC=82%, BC=83%, p=.81, see Figure 5.3b) as 
well as the variable Type of stimulus (identical=82%, non-identical=85%, 
p=.25). Instead, the variable Wordiness was significant [F(1,61)=8.33, p<.005, 
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η2p =.12] since participants were more accurate with words than with 
pseudowords stimuli (87% vs. 80%). The interactions between the three 
variables were not significant.  
 
  
 
 
Figure 5.3 - Accuracy in the “Same” and “Different” Condition in the Implicit 
task.  
The mean of correct responses in the “Same” (A) and “Different” Condition in the Implicit task as a 
function of Ownership (Self, Other) (B). Error bars depict SEMs. Differences significant at p<.05 are 
starred.  
 
5.3.2.2 Explicit Task 
Same owner 
The variable Owner was significant [F(2, 122)=6.96, p<.001; η2p =.10] since the 
condition with self stimuli (AA=79%) was worse than the conditions with 
familiar others‟ (BB=92%) and unfamiliar others‟ stimuli (CC=90%, p<.02 for 
both comparisons). The other two conditions (BB and CC) were not significantly 
different (p=.1, see Figure 5.4a). 
The variables Wordiness (words = pseudowords = 87%, p=.94) and Type of 
stimulus (identical=86% and non-identical=88%, p=.23) were not significant.  
The interactions between Owner X Type of stimulus was significant 
[F(2,122)=7.90, p<.0006; η2p =.11]: the condition identical stimuli and non-
identical stimuli were significantly different for self stimuli (74% vs 83%, 
p<.004) but not for familiar (93% vs 92% p=1) and unfamiliar stimuli (91% vs 
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88%, p=1). Moreover, identical self stimuli were worse than all other conditions 
(p<.004 for all comparisons). 
Different owner 
The variable Owner was significant [F(2, 122)=7.55, p<.0001; η2p =.11] since 
the conditions with one self stimulus (AB=75% and AC=73%) were worse than 
the conditions with others‟ stimuli (BC=87%, p<.007 for both comparisons, see 
Figure 5.4b). The two self conditions (AB and AC) were not significantly 
different (p=1). Also the variable Wordiness was significant [F(1,61)=4.07, 
p<.05, η2p =.06] since participants were more accurate with words than with 
pseudowords stimuli (80% vs. 76%).  
The variable Type of stimulus (identical=79% and non-identical=78%, p=.56) as 
well as the interactions were not significant.  
 
Figure 5.4- Accuracy in the “Same” and “Different” Condition in the Explicit 
task.  
The mean of correct responses in the “Same” (A) and “Different” Condition in the Explicit task as a 
function of Ownership (Self, Other) (B). Error bars depict SEMs. Differences significant at p<.05 are 
starred.  
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5.4 Discussion 
Here, for the first time implicit self-voice recognition is investigated and it is 
directly compared with explicit self-voice recognition. In our study, participants 
were submitted to a same/different task (Implicit task) and to a task during which 
they discriminated their own voice from familiar and unfamiliar voices (Explicit 
task).  
First of all, a difference between implicit and explicit self-voice recognition was 
found since self-voice was better recognized in the Implicit than in the Explicit 
task. One could expect that the pattern of results can be affected by a different 
level of difficulty of the two tasks. However, this possibility can be ruled out 
since others‟ voices were implicitly and explicitly recognized with the same 
accuracy and no difference was found when the two tasks were directly 
compared. 
Regarding the Implicit task, results showed no difference in accuracy between 
the self and other condition. Instead, in the Explicit task a lower accuracy for self 
than other condition was found (i.e. a self-disadvantage).  
As far as the self-disadvantage effect found for the explicit self-voice 
recognition, it is in line with previous evidence. For example, Rosa and 
colleagues (2008) with a forced-choice identification task, showed that 
participants were overall less accurate with self-voice (86%) compared to 
unfamiliar voice (95%). Similar results are reported by Hughes and Nicholson 
(2010) using face pictures and recorded voices. In their experiment, stimuli 
could belong to the participant or to another person and were combined in four 
different presentations: self-face/self-voice, self-face/other-voice, other-face/self-
voice and other-face/other-voice. Participants were required to perform three 
115 
 
different tasks: visual self-recognition, acoustical self-recognition and a third 
task where both visual and acoustical stimuli were combined. Authors found that 
when vocal and facial stimuli were separately presented, participants were less 
accurate for self than other‟s stimuli, both with face and voice stimuli. 
Interestingly, in the concurrent presentation, the worst accuracy was found in the 
condition where both stimuli, face and voice, belonged to the participant. 
The worse performance with self than others‟ voice in the Explicit task could be 
attributed to the fact that the sound of hearing one‟s own voice while speaking is 
perceived differently than while hearing one‟s own recorded voice. The 
discrepancy between one‟s own recorded voice and how each one subjectively 
hears one‟s own voice is due to conduction through air and bones that modifies 
the voice‟s characteristics (Maurer & Landis, 1990).  
Thus, it is possible that participants did not recognize a stimulus as their voice 
because it is not heard as they were used to and it didn‟t match the voice-
stimulus stored in memory. This hypothesis is also supported by a recent study 
by Xu and colleagues (Xu et al., 2013). Indeed, authors observed a facilitation in 
self-voice recognition only after specific manipulation of formant voice-
structures. 
Also neuroimaging evidence is in line with this hypothesis. Nakamura and 
colleagues (2001), comparing brain activity during self and unfamiliar voices 
recognition, found a selective involvement of the right frontal cortex when self 
rather than unfamiliar voices were presented. The authors proposed that this 
activation reflects retrieval effort, ascribed to a cognitive effort during self-voice 
recognition. This effect could be due to the fact that recorded voices, used as 
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stimuli in the experiment, were quite different from one‟s own voices stored in 
subject‟s memory.  
Furthermore, other studies suggest that when people are confronted with hearing 
a recording of their own voice, they tend to first respond with a negative 
affective reaction due to a discrepancy between what they expect to hear and 
what they actually hear. This negative reaction can be a possible explanation of 
the difficulty to match the heard voice with the “representation” of one‟s own 
voice and, in turn, of the self-disadvantage effect emerging in the Explicit task. 
In contrast, this sort of reaction doesn‟t occur when they hear others‟ recorded-
voice (Holzman & Rousey, 1966). The wide diffusion of mobile technologies in 
everyday life can have contributed to familiarize people with others‟ voice heard 
through artificial channels with light distortion. Accordingly with this 
assumption, in our study, although participants recognized their own voice with 
high accuracy, they better recognized others‟ recorded voice.  
The difficulty to explicitly recognize self-voice (self-disadvantage) is 
particularly evident when the couple of presented stimuli are two identical (dog-
dog) rather than two non-identical stimuli (dog-seal), both pronounced by the 
participant. This could be due to the fact that hearing two identical stimuli 
provided participants with less acoustic variability than two different stimuli. 
Therefore, they could exploit less acoustic cues to recognize their own voice. 
Regarding the Implicit task, an effect driven by stimuli‟ characteristics was 
observed: participants performed better with identical than non-identical stimuli 
when they were pronounced by same speakers and with words than pseudowords 
when stimuli were pronounced by different speakers. The facilitation for 
identical than non-identical stimuli in the „same owner condition‟, can be 
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explained with a sort of congruent-effect between “same-owner”/“same-stimuli”. 
Conversely, the facilitation for words than pseudowords found in the “different 
owner condition”, suggests that well-known words could help participants to 
focus on acoustic characteristics when voices are different. In any case, even if 
stimuli‟ characteristics influenced the same/different voice judgment, they did 
not interact with implicit recognition of speaker identity. Indeed, no interaction 
between stimuli‟ characteristics and Owner factor was found in the Implicit task. 
In conclusion, this study provides evidence suggesting that self-voice recognition 
processes are supported by different mechanisms and perhaps there are two 
distinct ways to access to self-voice knowledge: an implicit and an explicit one. 
This dissociation was put in evidence by both clinical and anatomo-functional 
studies. From a clinical point of view, a dissociation between implicit and 
explicit processing was described in brain damaged patients (i.e. in patients with 
blindsight, neglect, prosopoagnosia and anosognosia). Additionally, using a 
neuropsychological approach, Moro and colleagues (2011) investigated the 
neural correlates of implicit and explicit motor awareness in patients with 
anosognosia for hemiplegia. The authors found that deficits in implicit and 
explicit processes are associated with lesions involving different cortico-
subcortical structures, the former being more anterior and the latter ones being 
more posterior (see also Moro, 2013). Consistently, fMRI studies on healthy 
participants confirmed the involvement of frontal areas in implicit bodily self-
recognition (Devue et al., 2007; Ferri et al., 2012).  
Similarly, one‟s own face recognition also seems to recruit different networks 
when implicit rather than explicit processing was required. Indeed, implicit 
recognition of one‟s own face activated right inferior frontal regions and the 
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right insula (Devue et al., 2007), whereas explicit self-face recognition involved 
a wider distributed network across frontal, parietal and occipital regions (Kaplan 
et al., 2008; Uddin et al., 2005, 2006).  
To sum up, this evidence suggested that there are two distinct ways to access to 
recognition of self- voice, face and body-parts: the implicit and the explicit one. 
The neural bases of the implicit and explicit self-voice recognition should be 
more deeply investigated in future studies.  
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Chapter 6 
 
Implicit and Explicit self- other voice 
discrimination in brain damaged patients 
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6.1 Introduction 
When we are engaged in a conversation with someone else, we simultaneously 
catch information not only about the linguistic content but also about the identity 
of the speaker. However, these two aspects of speech are processed largely 
independently (von Kriegstein & Giraud, 2004; Schall et al., 2015). Here, we 
sought to investigate the mechanisms underlying voice identity recognition, 
which is an important aspect of self/other distinction.  
In the neuropsychological domain, relatively few studies investigated voice 
recognition disorders revealing how voice recognition impairment might occur 
due to brain lesion (for a review see Blank et al., 2014; but also Lang et al., 
2009; Peretz et al., 1994; Van Lancker et al., 1989; Van Lancker & Canter, 
1982). For example, Van Lancker and coworkers (1989) submitted left and right 
brain damaged patients to two different tasks. In the voice discrimination task 
participants were presented with pairs of unfamiliar voices and were required to 
decide whether the paired stimuli were same or different, whereas in the voice 
recognition task, familiar voices were adopted and participants were asked to 
recognize the target voice. Authors observed that defects in voice discrimination 
might occur following brain lesion including both left or right temporal lobe, 
whereas voice recognition was selectively impaired in right brain damaged 
patients. 
So far, none of the mentioned studies were focused on self-voice processing. 
Despite the lack of study on this field, it might be of great interest to elucidate 
how self-stimuli were processed in the acoustical domain. Indeed, several 
findings across different sensory modalities demonstrated how self-related 
information might be considered as a special stimulus (for reviews see Blanke, 
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2012; Longo, 2015). For instance, in a recent study (Rosa et al., 2008) 
participants were explicitly asked to decide whether acoustical stimuli 
represented or not their own voice: participants were less accurate with self-
voice (86%) compared to unfamiliar voice (95%). Furthermore, authors 
demonstrated a selective left-hand/right-hemisphere advantage for self-voice, 
supporting the existence of distinct mechanisms for processing self and other‟s 
related stimuli. Accordingly, neuroimaging data revealed that selective brain 
regions, such as the right (Kaplan et al., 2008) and the left inferior frontal gyri, 
(Allen et al., 2005) discriminate the sound of one‟s own voice compared to other 
people‟s voice.  
Most of these studies adopted an explicit paradigm, in which participants were 
directly asked to recognize their own voice (Allen et al., 2005; Rosa et al., 2008). 
Only few studies investigated the implicit recognition of self-voice, for instance 
by recording event related potentials while participants passively listened to 
acoustic stimuli pronounced either by the participant or by a familiar person or 
an unknown person (Graux et al., 2013, 2015).  
The distinction between implicit and explicit processing of self-related stimuli is 
particularly relevant since several studies have demonstrated the different 
contribution of implicit and explicit self-body knowledge to our sense of self. 
Indeed we are faster and/or more accurate in performing a discrimination task 
when one of the two displayed stimuli represents our own body, showing an 
implicit recognition of self-related stimuli (Ferri et al., 2011; Frassinetti et al., 
2011). By contrast, we do not show such facilitation when we are explicitly 
required to recognize our body. Neuropsychological studies have demonstrated 
that implicit recognition of one‟s own body is lost in brain damaged patients 
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following a right fronto-parietal lesion. This evidence suggested a critical role of 
this brain network in processing self body-parts stimuli, at least when an explicit 
recognition is not required.  
As far as voice recognition, very recently a similar dissociation was 
demonstrated in healthy participants (Candini et al., 2014). Crucially, this study 
directly compared implicit and explicit self-voice recognition by using the same 
stimuli and two different tasks: a voice identity discrimination task (Implicit 
task) and a self-voice recognition task (Explicit task). Participants listened to 
pairs of pre-recorded auditory stimuli pronounced by themselves, by a familiar 
or an unfamiliar person. Afterwards, in the discrimination task (Implicit task) 
participants had to judge whether the pair of stimuli were pronounced by same or 
different speakers. A facilitation in discriminating self versus other people‟s 
voice is the expression of an implicit self-voice knowledge. In the recognition 
task (Explicit task) participants had to identify if one of the paired stimuli was or 
not their own voice. Authors reported that healthy participants performed worse 
when were asked to explicitly, rather than implicitly, recognize their own voice, 
whereas no difference was found when others‟ voices were considered. These 
findings suggested that implicit and explicit self-voice recognition are subtended 
by different mechanisms.  
A fundamental contribution to our knowledge about the dissociation between 
implicit and explicit processing was given by neuropsychological studies. 
Indeed, focusing on neuropsychological disorders, from memory (Gabrieli et al., 
1995, Tulving, 1991) to body-representation (Moro, 2013; Tranel & Damasio, 
1985) as well as from visual to spatial deficits (Berti et al., 1994; Bertini et al., 
2013; Làdavas et al., 1993) much evidence has been reported of such a 
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dissociation. However, until now implicit and explicit self-voice recognition has 
never been directly compared in brain damaged patients. Here, in this theoretical 
framework, we investigate the distinct contribution of right and left hemisphere 
to implicit and explicit self-voice recognition. 
To this aim, we recruited a sample of healthy participants and brain damaged 
patients affected by right or left focal lesions. Participants were submitted to two 
different tasks designed for testing implicit and explicit self-voice recognition. 
The former is configured as a voice identity discrimination task (Implicit task) 
and the latter one as a self-voice recognition task (Explicit task).  
We expect distinct pattern of results with right (RBD) and left brain damaged 
(LBD) patients in implicit and explicit self-voice recognition. In the Implicit 
task, we expect a deficit in RBD but not in LBD patients with self-voice, 
similarly to what has been found for self-stimuli in the visual domain (Frassinetti 
et al.,  2008, 2009, 2010). This would prove that the right hemisphere is involved 
in the implicit processing of corporal self-related stimuli regardless of the 
modality of presentation (visual or acoustic), As far as the Explicit task, we 
expect a deficit in self-other voice discrimination both in RBD and in LBD 
patients. This would be in line with neuroimaging studies showing that both left 
and right hemispheres are relevant in processing the identity of acoustical stimuli 
(Allen et al., 2005; Kaplan et al., 2008). 
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6.2 Materials and methods 
6.2.1 Participants  
A total of twenty consecutive brain damaged patients were recruited at the 
Fondazione Maugeri Hospital (Castel Goffredo, Italy) and at the Sol et Salus 
Hospital (Rimini, Italy) to participate in the study. Ten of them were affected by 
right hemispheric lesion (RBD; 8 males; mean±sd age = 67.5±8.61 years; 
mean±sd education = 7.4±4.17 years) and ten patients were affected by left 
hemispheric lesion (LBD; 5 males; mean±sd age = 70.7±5.3 years; mean±sd 
education = 5.9±1.5 years).  
Ten healthy participants (Controls; 4 males, mean±sd age = 64.6±6.1 years; 
mean±sd education = 10.4±5.7 years) matched for gender and handedness served 
as controls. Two one-way ANOVAs showed that three groups (Controls, RBD 
and LBD patients) did not significantly differ neither for age [F(2,27)=1.42, 
p=.26] nor for education [F(2,27)=2.78, p=.08].  
All participants were right handed by their own verbal report and without 
auditory pathology. All participants were Italian speakers and naive to the 
purpose of the study. Written informed consent was obtained before taking part 
in the experimental procedure. The study was approved by the local ethics 
committee (Department of Psychology, Bologna) and all procedures were in 
agreement with the Declaration of Helsinki (2008).  
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6.2.2 Neuropsychological assessment  
All patients were administered the Mini-Mental State Examination (Folstein et 
al., 1975) to screen for a general cognitive impairment. Furthermore, the Token 
Test (De Renzi & Vignolo, 1962) and the Bell‟s Cancellation (Gauthier et al.,  
1987) were adopted to assess verbal comprehension and extrapersonal neglect, 
respectively (see Table 6.1 for more details).  
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Table 6.1: Clinical and neuropsychological data of left and right brain 
damaged patients according to the lesion site. 
Demographical and clinical details Neuropsychological Examination 
Patient TPL  Age Education MMSE TOKEN  
TEST  Bell's Test 
LBD 1 28 71 8 19,4 22 1 
LBD 2 39 77 5 24 29,5 0 
LBD 3 40 62 5 22 26,25 6 
LBD 4 45 71 8 27,2 35,75 0 
LBD 5 59 69 4 24,4 26,5 -5 
LBD 6 84 64 6 24 32,25 0 
LBD 7 1825 71 5 24,5 29 0 
LBD 8 2850 68 8 30 30,25 -1 
LBD 9 6245 77 5 30 27,5 0 
LBD 10 71 77 5 24 26,5 0 
RBD 1 27 73 5 28,3 32 0 
RBD 2 71 57 7 28 33 9 
RBD 3 113 75 5 24,7 31 11 
RBD 4 128 56 3 27,2 31,75 5 
RBD 5 164 60 13 25,5 30,75 7 
RBD 6 192 77 4 24 26,5 6 
RBD 7 744 80 3 26,5 31,25 -2 
RBD 8 1100 66 13 24,2 31 2 
RBD 9 1541 62 13 25,5 31,25 7 
RBD 10 1620 69 8 30 34 0 
LBD = left brain damaged patients; RBD = right brain damaged patients; TPL = 
Time post lesion (days); Education and Age are indicated in years. MMSE = 
Mini Mental State Examination (scores are corrected for years of education and 
age; cut off > 24); Token Test = cut off > 26.5; Bell‟s Test = contralesional 
minus ipsilesional omissions (cut off < 5).  
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6.2.3 Stimuli  
In a first session, voices were recorded in a silent room by using a recorder 
positioned at 60 cm from participant‟s trunk. Participants‟ voice was recorded 
while they pronounced Italian words and pseudowords presented on a sheet of 
paper (A4 format). They were invited to maintain a flat tone of voice and to 
pronounce items as clearly as possible. If the experimenter judged the recorded 
items not easily discriminable, asked participants to repeat them until they were.  
Words were disyllabic and high-frequency stimuli (in Italian: cane, foca, lupo, 
alce, rana e topo; in English: dog, seal, wolf, elk, frog, mouse) belonging to the 
same semantic category (animal). Pseudowords were obtained from the words by 
means of two letters replacement (cona, faco, lusa, leca, tupi e rona). 
Subsequently, each vocal stimulus was digitized at 44100 Hz, 16 bit, stereo 
modality, and elaborated using dedicated software (Cool Edit Pro) to adjust 
overall sound pressure and to balance the volume. The mean duration of each 
stimulus was 623.5 ms (SD = 89.5; range = 532-816 ms). Each stimulus could 
represent participant‟s voice (A stimulus), the voice of a familiar other (B 
stimulus) or the voice of an unfamiliar other (C stimulus). Each participant was 
asked to bring someone they encounter on a daily basis, of the same race and 
gender. This person served as the „familiar other‟.   
 
6.2.4 Procedure 
Each trial started with a central fixation point (250 ms duration), followed by the 
sequential presentation (500 ms ISI) of a pair of vocal stimuli. The trial was 
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time-out as soon as the participant responded. Inter-trial timing was fixed at 
1000 msec.  
According to Candini et al. (2014), in each trial the two stimuli could either 
belong to the same person (same trials) or to different people (different trials). 
Moreover, stimuli could belong to the participant (A), familiar other (B) or 
unfamiliar other (C). Thus, three combinations of “same” stimuli (AA, BB and 
CC) and three combinations of “different” stimuli (AB, AC and BC) were 
presented. Voices were matched for gender, age and regional accent. Finally, in 
half of the “same” and “different” trials stimuli could be identical (i.e. cane/cane 
or cona/cona), in the other half not (i.e. cane/foca or cona/faco). Presentation of 
each word/pseudoword was counterbalance between “same” and “different” 
trials under the six combinations. Words and pseudowords were presented in two 
separate blocks. In each block, 4 trials for each combination of stimuli according 
with the voice‟s owner (AA-BB-CC-AC-AB-BC) were presented for a total of 
24 trials. The presentation order and the sequence of the type of stimuli (identical 
and no-identical) and owner factors (AA-BB-CC-AC-AB-BC) were randomized 
between trials, whereas the two blocks (words and pseudowords) were balanced 
between participants.   
Participants sat in front of a PC screen at a distance of about 60 cm, and were 
required to press two previously assigned response keys, one for affirmative 
(YES) and one for negative (NO) answers. Response buttons were 
counterbalanced between participants. Stimuli were delivered through earphones 
and were presented binaurally. E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tool ©1996-
2012) was adopted to control stimuli presentation and randomization. Key press 
RTs and response accuracy were recorded. 
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First of all, participants were instructed to ignore the linguistic content and to 
attend to the voice. In the Implicit task, participants were asked to judge whether 
the two voices were the “same” (half participants) or “different” (half 
participants). In the Explicit task, all participants were required to explicitly 
judge whether at least one of the two voices corresponded to their one own 
voice. Additionally, no feedback on the accuracy of given responses was 
provided during the experiment (see Figure 6.1). 
 
Figure 6.1 - An example of experimental trial.  
The picture depicted an example of experimental trial in which two paired voices were subsequently 
presented. 
 
All participants performed the two recognition tasks in one single session, with 
eight practice trials before the main experiment. Auditory stimuli used during the 
training period were not used in the subsequent experiment. To avoid an 
interference effect of the explicit recognition of one‟s own voice on the 
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“same/different” task, the Implicit Task was always conducted before the 
Explicit task. The whole experiment took approximately half an hour. 
 
6.2.5 Statistical analysis  
We compared Self and Other conditions according with the definition adopted in 
our previous study (Candini et al., 2014), that is trials in which at least one 
stimulus belonged to the participant (Self condition: AA-AB-AC) and trials in 
which no stimulus belonged to the participant (Other condition: BB-CC-BC).  
To elucidate possible differences across the three groups, we conducted an 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) on accuracy (% of correct responses) with 
Group (Controls, RBD and LBD patients) as between-subject factor, with Task 
(Implicit/Explicit task) and Owner (Self/Other condition) as within-subject 
factors. Post-hoc comparisons were conducted by using Duncan Test. The 
magnitude of effect size was expressed by partial eta square (η2p). 
6.3 Results  
6.3.1 Comparison between healthy participants, RBD and LBD patients  
A significant effect of the Group factor was found [F(2,27)=8.92, p<.001, 
η2p=.39] which was mainly accounted for by lower accuracy for both RBD and 
LBD patients‟ groups (RBD Patients = 63%; LBD Patients = 64%, p<.009 for all 
comparisons) compared to Controls (82%). Conversely, RBD and LBD patients 
were not significantly different (p=.76). The variable Task [F(1,27)=8.02, 
p<.009, η2p=.23] (Implicit = 74% vs. Explicit = 65%) was significant. 
Furthermore, a significant three-way interaction with Group x Owner x Task 
was found [F(2,27)=4.54, p<.02, η2p=.25]. When patients and Controls were 
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directly compared, post-hoc comparisons showed completely different effects in 
RBD and LBD patients in the Implicit and in the Explicit task. First of all, in the 
Implicit task, with Self stimuli, RBD patients (62%) performed significantly 
worse than Controls (86%, p<.04). Conversely, comparing LBD patients and 
Controls (68% vs. 86%, p=.11) no difference was found. As far as Others’ 
stimuli, no differences were found in each group as well as across the three 
groups (RBD = 68%; LBD = 71%; Controls = 87%; all ps>.10).  
Furthermore, in the Explicit task, with Other stimuli, RBD patients (50%) 
performed significantly worse than Controls (89%; p<.001) and LBD patients 
(73%; p<.05). Conversely, with Self stimuli, LBD patients (44%) performed 
significantly worse than Controls (65%, p<.05) and RBD patients (71%; p<.02). 
Crucially, no significant difference emerged for Other stimuli comparing LBD 
patients and Controls (p=.14), nor for Self stimuli comparing RBD patients and 
Controls (p=.61; see Figure 6.2A). Moreover, a self-disadvantage was found 
both in Controls (Self = 65% vs. Other = 88%; p<.05) and LBD patients (Self = 
44% vs. Other = 73%; p<.02), but not in RBD patients (Self = 71% vs. Other = 
50%; p=.07) (see Figures 6.2B-D).  
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Figure 6.2 - Accuracy in the Implicit and Explicit task  
The comparison between RBD and LBD patients and Controls (A) and each experimental group RBD (B) 
and LBD patients (C) and Controls (D) respectively. Between-group (2A) and within-group (2B-D) 
differences significant at p<.05 are starred. Error bars depict SEMs. 
 
To better understand the nature of errors made by patients in the explicit 
recognition of self-voice, False Alarms (erroneous recognition of Self non 
present) and Omissions (erroneous rejection of Self present) were compared in 
RBD and LBD patients. Significant differences were found revealing different 
patterns in RBD and LBD patients. Indeed, RBD (50%) made higher False 
Alarms than LBD patients (27%; t18 = -2.50; p<.02; see Figure 6.3A), since they 
more frequently misattributed the other‟s voice to themselves when their one‟s 
own voice was not actually present. Conversely, LBD (56%) made higher 
Omissions than RBD patients (30%; t18 = 1.94; p<.05; see Figure 6.3B). 
133 
 
 
Figure 6.3 - The mean of false alarms and omissions for LBD and RBD patients. 
False alarms (A) and Omissions (B) are expressed as a percentage of error. Error bars depict SEMs. 
Differences significant at p<.05 are starred.  
 
6.3.2 Analysis for testing the effect of time post lesion onset 
Furthermore, since alterations in voice production have been described in 
patients following cerebral stroke (Vuković, et al., 2012), in order to exclude that 
the observed results might be simply ascribed to the time post lesion onset, an 
Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) was conducted on accuracy with time post 
lesion (indicated as days from the lesion onset) as covariate factor, Group (RBD 
and LBD patients) as between-subject factor, and with Task (Implicit/Explicit 
task) and Owner (Self/Other condition) as within-subject factors. 
However, none significant effect emerged neither for the time post lesion factor 
[F(1,18)=0.43, p=.52], nor for its interaction with other variables (Task, Owner 
and Group). 
 
6.3.3 Analysis for testing Wordiness and Familiarity effect  
To investigate the possible effect of Wordiness (word and pseudoword) on voice 
recognition, further analyses were conducted on Implicit and Explicit tasks 
separately. Since for „„same owner‟‟ (AA–BB–CC) only one source of variance 
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(one speaker) was present whereas for „„different owner‟‟ (AB–AC–BC) two 
sources of variance (two speakers) were present, separate ANOVAs were 
conducted. More specifically, two separate ANOVAs for „„Same‟‟ owner trials 
(AA = self-self, BB = familiar-other/familiar-other, CC = unfamiliar-
other/unfamiliar-other) and „„Different‟‟ owner trials (AB = self/familiar-other, 
AC = self/unfamiliar-other; BC = familiar-other/unfamiliar-other) were carried 
out, with Group (Controls, RBD and LBD patients) as between-subjects factor 
and Wordiness (word and pseudoword) as within-subject factor.  
However, in all the analysis none significant effect emerged neither for the 
variables Wordiness and  Familiarity, nor for their interactions with other 
variables (Owner and Group).  
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6.3.4 Analysis for implicit and explicit dissociations within the RBD patients 
group 
To elucidate the anatomical correlate of a selective deficit, the presence of 
possible dissociation in implicit and explicit self-voice processing was 
investigated in each patient. 
Since in the group analysis possible dissociations may have gone unobserved, we 
therefore compared the performance of each patient with the performance of the 
control group for self and others‟ voice, separately in the Implicit and in the 
Explicit task, by using a modified t-test which takes into account the size of the 
control group (Crawford & Garthwaite, 2002).  
This comparison revealed that 70% of RBD patients (7/10) were selectively 
impaired in the implicit or in the explicit voice processing compared to controls. 
Crucially, 4 out of 7 RBD patients were selectively impaired in the implicit self-
voice recognition, whereas other patients (3 out of 7 RBD patients) were 
selectively impaired in the explicit recognition of other‟s voice. 
6.4 Lesion study 
To explore which cerebral areas are involved in self/other voice discrimination, 
brain lesions of 7 RBD and 7 LBD patients were identified by Computed 
Tomography and Magnetic Resonance digitalized images (CT/MRI)
1
. Then 
lesion location and extension were delineated and manually mapped in the 
stereotactic space of the MNI by using the free software MRIcro (Rorden and 
Brett, 2000). As first step, MNI template was rotated (pitch only) to approximate 
                                                 
1 The CT/MRI scan of 7 out of 10 RBD patients, and of 7 out of 10 LBD patients were available. 
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the slice plane of the patient‟s scan. A trained rater (MC), using anatomically 
landmarks, manually mapped the lesion onto each correspondent template slice. 
After that, drawn lesions were inspected by a second trained rater (FF) and in 
case of disagreement, an intersection lesion map was used. Finally, lesions maps 
were rotated back into the standard space applying the inverse of the 
transformation parameters used on the stage of adaptation to the brain scan.  
In order to extract the region that could be crucial for implicit and explicit self-
other discrimination we separately overlaid lesions of left and right brain 
damaged patients. The maximum lesion overlap of RBD patients‟ lesions (green 
and light blue regions, which depict 4 and 3 out of 7 RBD patients, respectively) 
was mainly located along two different regions: one more anterior, involving 
cortical and subcortical frontal regions (caudate, putamen, internal capsule and 
the inferior frontal operculum) and the insular cortex, and one more posterior 
region, mainly located along the middle temporal and the angular gyri (for a 
graphical representation see Figure 6.4A). The maximum lesion overlap of LBD 
patients‟ lesions involved the fronto-insular region, the temporal pole and the 
inferior parietal lobe (for a graphical representation see Figure 6.4B).   
 
Figure 6.4 - Overlay of reconstructed lesion plots of RBD and LBD patients 
superimposed onto MNI template.  
The number of overlapping lesions is illustrated by different colors coding from violet (n = 1) to red (n = 7). 
The region with maximum overlap is shown in green and light blue for RBD (A) and LBD patients (B) 
respectively. 
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Furthermore, since two distinct deficits were observed within the RBD patients 
group, we separately overlaid patients‟ lesions impaired with others‟ voice in the 
Explicit task and impaired with self-voice in the Implicit task. 
The RBD patients who showed a selective impairment in the Explicit task when 
others‟ voice was presented were affected by lesion involving a subcortical 
frontal region (caudate, putamen and internal capsule) and the insular cortex (see 
Figure 6.5A). Conversely, RBD patients selectively impaired in implicit self-
voice recognition were affected by lesion involving a more posterior region, 
mainly located along the superior/middle temporal and the angular gyri (see 
Figure 6.5B). 
 
Figure 6.5 - Overlay of reconstructed lesion plots of RBD patients. 
Lesion plots of RBD patients impaired with others‟ voice in the Explicit task (A) and 
impaired with self-voice in the Implicit task (B) superimposed onto MNI template. The region 
with maximum overlap is shown in green.  
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6.5 Discussion 
In this study we investigated the contribution of right and left hemisphere in 
implicit and explicit self/other voice recognition. To this aim, RBD and LBD 
patients and a group of age-matched neurologically healthy subjects were 
submitted to two different tasks designed for testing voice discrimination 
(Implicit task) and voice identity recognition (Explicit Task) respectively.  
Different patterns of results were found in the two experimental tasks adopted. In 
the discrimination task, when an explicit recognition of one‟s own voice was not 
required (Implicit Task), we observe a difference across the three groups. When 
the participant‟s voice was present, our results revealed a selective impairment of 
RBD patients compared to Controls in voice discrimination. This deficit was not 
present in LBD patients. Considering other people‟s voice, we did not observe 
any difference across the three groups.  
These findings are in line with several neuropsychological studies on bodily self-
representation in which patients following a right brain damage lost the 
facilitation, typically showed by healthy subjects and by patients with a left brain 
lesion, in performing a visual matching task when a stimulus depicting their own 
body was presented (Frassinetti et al., 2008, 2009, 2010). Taken together, the 
data on voice and body ownership strongly suggest that the right hemisphere is 
key when an implicit processing of self-related stimuli is required, regardless of 
their modality. More specifically, anatomical data from RBD patients with an 
impairment in implicit self-voice processing provide evidence for a crucial 
involvement of temporal and parietal regions.  
By contrast, when an explicit self-voice recognition was required (Explicit task), 
significant differences emerged both within and across the three groups. Indeed, 
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healthy participants as well as LBD patients showed a worse performance when 
at least one of the two paired stimuli was their own voice compared to when both 
stimuli belonged to other people (self-disadvantage effect). Interestingly, this 
phenomenon was not observed in RBD patients.  
The self-disadvantage effect observed in healthy controls and LBD patients is in 
line with previous results reported by our group on young healthy participants 
(Candini et al., 2014). The worse performance with self than others‟ voice in the 
Explicit task could be explained by the discrepancy between one‟s own recorded 
voice and how we subjectively perceive our own voice during speaking. Indeed, 
it is well-known that conduction through air and bones modifies the voice‟s 
characteristics (Maurer & Landis, 1990). Thus, one may argue that participants 
did not recognize a vocal stimulus as their voice because this voice was not 
heard as they were used to and it did not match the voice-stimulus stored in 
memory. Consistently, a recent study suggested that after specific manipulation 
of formant voice-structures, participants improve their performance on self-voice 
recognition (Xu et al., 2013).  
The absence of the self-disadvantage effect in RBD patients is mainly explained 
by their worse performance, compared to Controls, with others‟ stimuli, but not 
with self-stimuli.  
Interestingly, a completely different performance was observed in LBD patients 
who exhibited a selective deficit in recognizing their own voice compared to 
Controls, whereas no difference was found when others‟ stimuli are considered.  
Since the time post lesion onset did not affect patients performance (see 
Covariate analysis) we can hypothesize that the observed deficit is specifically 
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related to the lesion site and cannot be ascribed to a deficit in recognizing a voice 
that can be modified post- compared to pre-lesion (Vuković et al., 2012).  
We can hypothesize that in order to explicitly recognize a voice as our own 
voice, we define the boundary between what is the self and what is not. 
However, our judgment can be erroneous into two different ways: we can refuse 
the self-stimuli as our own voice,  or we can misidentify the other as our own 
voice. These wrong judgments seem to reflect different impairments in the 
self/other distinction. The completely different performance observed following 
a right or a left brain damage are likely to suggest that in order to appropriately 
recognize a stimulus as belonging to the self, both hemispheres are involved, at 
least when the acoustical domain is investigated. Accordingly, looking more 
deeply on patients‟ type of errors in the Explicit task, we found a significant 
difference between RBD and LBD patients when false alarms and omissions are 
considered: LBD patients erroneously rejected their own voice when it was 
present (omissions) whereas RBD patients more frequently misattributed the 
other‟s voice to themselves when their own voice was not actually present (false 
alarms). 
As far as LBD patients, they showed an amplified self-disadvantage effect, 
resulting in a pathological tendency to refuse the presented voice as their own. 
This deficit was associated with lesion encompassing the left hemisphere 
involving fronto-insular and temporal regions. In this respect, neuroimaging 
evidence provides support for a cerebral network lateralized in the left 
hemisphere which may play a role in attributing self-related information. For 
instance,  a study conducted with schizophrenic patients, reported a similar 
misattribution of self-generated speech to an alien source. This misidentification 
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was associated with functional abnormalities in the left temporal cortex and in 
the anterior cingulate bilaterally (Allen et al., 2007).  
Regarding the misattribution of the other voice to themselves observed in RBD 
patients, we may suggest that this phenomena is linked with an interesting 
clinical behavior reported in the context of body ownership delusion, which was 
defined “pathological embodiment” (Garbarini et al., 2014). In this respect, 
hemiplegic patients who did not explicitly deny that their contralesional (left) 
arms belonged to themselves in everyday activity, claimed that an alien hand 
was their own when it was placed according to their egocentric coordinates. 
Thus, here we propose that RBD patients show a pathological embodiment of 
other people‟s voice, since they misidentified other people‟s voice as their own.  
From an anatomical point of view, in our study RBD patients who showed a 
pathological embodiment of others‟ voice were affected by lesions that mainly 
involved cortical and subcortical frontal regions (caudate, putamen and internal 
capsule) and the insular cortex. This lesion location may explain the tendency in 
self-attributing others‟ voice. Indeed, the damage of putamen and paraventricular 
white matter is compatible with the ones identified for being responsible for 
pathological embodiment, provided by Garbarini and coworkers (2013). More 
specifically, the lesion location previously reported (Garbarini et al., 2013) 
involved the right basal ganglia and the periventricular region. In this respect, 
authors proposed that a damage to the white matter tract linking subcortical 
structures with cortical sensory-motor areas may lead to a deficit in the 
construction of a coherent corporeal representation.  
Furthermore, the lesion of the right frontal lobe and the insular cortex may 
explain the impairment in self/other distinction. Accordingly, in a PET study 
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when a group of healthy participants were asked to recognize their own voice 
from unfamiliar voice, greater activity was observed in the right parainsular 
cortex (Nakamura et al., 2001). Finally, in a recent fMRI study, Kaplan and 
colleagues (2008) demonstrated that seeing our own face and hearing our own 
voice mainly activated the right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), suggesting that this 
region is involved in “self-representation” across different sensory modalities.  
The present study for the first time has investigated the neuroanatomical 
substrates of self-voice recognition in brain damaged patients. Our lesions‟ 
findings demonstrate a crucial role played by the right hemisphere in implicit 
processing of one‟s own voice and the involvement of both hemispheres when an 
explicit recognition of voice identity is required. In this respect, a prominent 
contribution of the right and of the left hemisphere emerges for others‟ and for 
self-voice explicit recognition, respectively. 
Overall, these results suggest that self-voice conveys acoustic information which 
participates in shaping a comprehensive bodily self-representation and  allows us 
to feel that our corporeal self belongs to ourselves.  
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General discussion 
The present dissertation aim at investigating the mechanisms through which we 
recognize our corporeal appearance, that‟s to what we commonly refer with the 
term “bodily self”. Furthermore, our physical body also represents the actual 
boundary between what and what not belonged to ourselves, thus contributing to 
the self-other discrimination. The key question of the present thesis is whether 
and how our body-parts and our voice may be considered as cues to properly 
distinguish between self and others. 
Starting from the recognition of the one‟s own body, mounting evidence 
suggested that two distinct mechanisms underlying the bodily self-recognition. 
Indeed, it has been shown that we have an implicit knowledge about our body, 
demonstrated by the self-advantage effect, that‟s a better performance with self‟ 
compared to others‟ stimuli (Frassinetti et al., 2008). Conversely, this facilitation 
is absent when an explicit body recognition is required (Frassinetti et al., 2011). 
The existence of such a dissociation between implicit and explicit processing of 
bodily self is in line with several evidence provided by neuropsychological 
studies on bodily recognition and sense of body-ownership, such as 
somatoparaphrenia and anosognosia (for a review see Vallar & Ronchi, 2006, 
2009; Moro et al., 2008). 
The present dissertation contributes to the current debate investigating whether 
implicit and explicit bodily self-recognition are mediated by different cerebral 
networks and can be selectively impaired after brain lesion. Accordingly, the 
study described in Chapter 3 mainly addressed this issue submitting a group of 
brain damaged patients to two different tasks designed to test implicit and 
explicit bodily self-recognition. 
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Our results demonstrated that in the Implicit task, controls and LBD patients, but 
not RBD patients, showed an advantage for self-body stimuli. In the Explicit task 
no facilitation emerged in controls and patients. In addition double dissociations 
were found: 25% of RBD patients showed a selective deficit in implicit and 10% 
in explicit bodily self-processing, whereas 8% of LBD patients were selectively 
impaired in explicit processing. Based on both behavioral and anatomical data, 
we suggest that an integrated right cortical–subcortical motor network underpins 
implicit knowledge of bodily self, whereas both hemispheres contribute to 
elaborate our explicit body knowledge. The existence of two of distinct networks 
(implicit and explicit) for self-body recognition could be particularly relevant for 
the diagnosis and rehabilitation of these disorders. 
The ability to recognize one‟s own body is strictly related to the sense of body-
ownership. Such a relationship became of a crucial relevance for patients who 
exhibited a pathological embodiment of others‟ people body-parts. This 
interesting issue has been addressed in the neuropsychological study described in 
Chapter 4. Specifically, we investigated whether implicit and explicit bodily self-
recognition are differently affected by a disorder of bodily ownership. 
Patients with (E+) and without pathological embodiment (E-) were compared 
during two different tasks designed to test implicit and explicit bodily self-
recognition. 
Our results demonstrated that E+ patients were impaired both in implicit and 
explicit processing of bodily self-recognition. Indeed, they showed a deficit in 
implicit processing of self and others body-parts. This effect was not found in E- 
patients. This difference suggested the presence of a profound alteration E+ 
group when a self-other discrimination, mainly based on visual cues, is required. 
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Moreover, a different performance between E+ and E- patients was found when 
an explicit bodily self-recognition was required. Indeed, E+ patients showed a 
selective impairment in explicit recognition of other’s body-parts, whereas E- 
patients showed a selective impairment when an explicit recognition of self 
body-parts was required.  
Finally, in Chapters 5 and 6 we explored possible dissociation between implicit 
and explicit self-recognition using acoustical stimuli, such as the one‟s own 
voice. First of all, the existence of distinct mechanisms in self-voice processing 
underlying implicit and explicit recognition was investigate in neurologically 
healthy individuals (Chapter 5). Participants listened to pairs of pre-recorded 
auditory stimuli (words or pseudowords) pronounced by themselves, by a 
familiar or an unfamiliar person. In the “Implicit task” participants had to judge 
whether the pair of stimuli were pronounced by same or different speakers 
whereas in the Explicit task they had to identify if one of the pair of stimuli was 
or not their own voice. Results showed a difference between Implicit and 
Explicit tasks since participants were more accurate in implicit than in explicit 
self-voice recognition. Moreover, in the Implicit task, participants had the same 
level of accuracy when they had to judge stimuli pronounced with self or others‟ 
voice. Conversely, when an explicit voice-recognition was required, they were 
less accurate with self than with others‟ voice. Here, for the first time, we 
demonstrated that people have an implicit and/or explicit access to self-voice 
knowledge. 
The last study, described in Chapter 6, sought neural correlates of implicit and 
explicit self-voice recognition processing in neuropsychological patients. In the 
Implicit task, RBD patients showed a selective impairment when self-voice was 
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presented, while no differences were found in LBD patients and Controls. In the 
Explicit task a different pattern of results emerged: Controls and LBD patients 
showed a worse performance in recognizing their own than other‟s voice, 
whereas RBD patients performed worse compared to Controls when others‟ 
voice recognition was required. Additionally, error analysis revealed that LBD 
patients erroneously rejected their own voice when it was actually presented, 
whereas RBD patients misidentified other people‟s voice as their own.  
This phenomenon resembles the above mentioned delusion of bodily ownership 
called “pathological embodiment”. Here, for the first time a pathological 
embodiment with others‟ voice is reported.  
Furthermore, we provide anatomical evidence supporting the involvement of 
right hemisphere in the implicit processing of self-voice and the contribution of 
both hemispheres when an explicit recognition of voice identity is required. Our 
findings underline the relevance of acoustic information conveyed by our voice 
in self/other distinction. 
In conclusion, the present dissertation provide behavioral and 
neuropsychological evidence to support implicit and explicit processing of self-
related stimuli across different sensory modalities, such as visual and acoustic. 
Moreover, the brain networks underline the implicit and explicit self-recognition 
are explored. In this respect, our findings on self-body and self-voice processing 
are likely to suggest that the right hemisphere is key when self‟ stimuli are 
implicitly processed, whereas both hemispheres contribute to the explicit 
recognition of the one‟s own bodily stimuli. 
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